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I. INTRODUCTION
The internal law of corporations is built upon the problem of com-
petition-not comptition with the world outside the corporate entity,
which, according to liberal economic theory, is essential to the increase
of wealth and well-being in society, but competition among the various
groups of individuals that animate the corporation. The problem is (to
extend the implicit metaphor) as if a human being's internal organs
were constantly battling to capture all of the body's energy, rather than
working together to contribute to the well-being of the whole. Like the
human body, the corporation's "energy" (its assets) is, at any given
point in time, limited so that successful competition by one group nec-
essarily deprives others of a share of these resources.
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A. Williams College, 1978;
J.D. Columbia University, 1981. I would like to thank Cheryl Block, Miriam Galston, Theresa
Gabaldon, Hether Macfarlane, Morey McDaniel, Beth Nolan, Lew Solomon, and Corby Sturges for
their comments and insights on an earlier draft of this Article, as well as Steven M. H. Wallman
for his helpful insights. I would also like to thank Mary Mullin for her research help.
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Of course without some form of check, such constant internal com-
petition would destroy the corporation, much as it would destroy the
human body. A large portion of the entity's energy would be spent in
the internal battle for control. Even if one group (or organ) were to
emerge dominant, all are interdependent and cannot survive alone, so
that the dominant group could not support the entity against the
outside world, and all would succumb collectively to external pressures.
An examination of the corporate governance structure' that has
evolved in American law leads to the conclusion that corporate law, like
nature, has created devices to avoid such a result by regulating this in-
ternal competition. Corporate law does this in two ways. First, it limits
the possibility of internal competition to two groups, stockholders and
managers, by artificially excluding from the corporate structure other
groups that, in reality, are essential to the corporation's survival: em-
ployees, debt-holders, suppliers, customers, and the community at
large.2 The traditional structure of corporate law reflects the assump-
tion that without such exclusions, the corporation would implode from
the competition among these groups for the limited assets that define
the corporation.3 By imposing such exclusions, the law limits the web of
1. In this Article I am concerned only with large, publicly-held corporations. Although I do
not define the term "large," adequate definitions exist. See, for example, American Law Institute
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommentations § 1.19 at 28 (Am. Law Inst.,
Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991) (hereinafter "ALI Principles of Corporate Governance"); Melvin A. Ei-
senberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis § 5.2 (Little, Brown, 1976).
2. It does this, as I shall explain in notes 79-120 and accompanying text, by imposing fiduci-
ary duties on directors which, in effect (although not in form), benefit only the stockholders. For
more elaboration on this argument, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Frame-
work for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Texas L. Rev. 579, 631-33 (1992).
There is no serious disagreement with the proposition that directors' fiduciary duties are di-
rected towards the stockholders. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 602 (1982) (identifying as a "conventional assumption"
the duty of management to maximize wealth for the exclusive benefit of stockholder/owners); Jay
William Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards at 11, 38, 45, 49
(Harv. Bus. Press, 1990) (confirming that most corporate directors believe that their legal responsi-
bility is to the stockholders). Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum question the stockholder-cen-
tric model, but see the path to broader constituency consideration and long-term social welfare as
best achieved by reordering the structure of corporate governance in a way that intermittently
increases the power of large stockholders. Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, A Proposal for a
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 187 (1991).
Some corporations statutes permit the corporation to grant voting rights to bondholders, but
this is exceptional and outside of the traditional structure of corporate law. See Harry G. Henn
and John R. Alexander, Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises at 155 (West, 3d ed.
1983).
3. This implication, which I shall discuss further in Part II, arises from a comparison of the
legal structure of the corporation with the reality of its operations, as well as from the reactions of
judges and commentators to whom expansion of the legal model is suggested. For examples of such
reactions, see, for example, James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
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competition for corporate assets to a manageable bilateral structure,
making possible the second device employed by corporate law to ensure
corporate survival: restraint of competition between managers and
stockholders by imposing upon managers the legal duty to act in the
interests of the stockholders. Corporate law thus attempts to destroy
internal competition by proclaiming that the managers' interests are to
be those of the stockholders.4 At the same time, corporate law adopts
the perspective of ne6classical economics, assuming that managers, like
all individuals, are rational utility maximizers who naturally act in their
own best interests.' Thus, the identification of managers' and stock-
holders' interests is enforced by means of a series of rules designed to
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 97 (1991); James J. Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constitu-
t'ncx' Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, 3 Insights No. 3 at 20 (1989);
Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Law, Other
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253 (1990). For a different read-
ing that attributes the artificiality of the corporate structure to a desire for certainty, see Christo-
pher Stanley, Corporate Personality and Capitalist Relations: A Critical Analysis of the Artifice
of Company Law, 19 Cambrian L. Rev. 97, 102 (1988). See also Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W.
Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23
Osgoode Hall L. Rev. 543 (1985) (looking at corporate law from a feminist perspective).
4. This, of course, is the fiduciary duty of loyalty. See generally Robert C. Clark, Corporate
Lau at 141-262 (Little, Brown, 1986); Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (stating that directors are agents of stockholders); Harfi v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133 (Del.
1975) (holding that derivative litigation standing is limited to stockholders); American Law Insti-
tute Principles Of Corporate Goverance: Analysis And Recommendations § 7.02 at 624-25 (Am.
Law Inst., Tent. Draft No. 8 1988) (standing granted to convertible bondholders); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165, 1191 n.103
(1990) (suggesting that "directors' duties are to be exercised for the ultimate benefit of the stock-
holders"); Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2).
Agency cost theorists suggest that self-interested managerial behavior will lead to the protec-
tion of stockholders' long-term interests without the need for extensive legal regulation. See, for
example Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 295-
305 (1980).
5. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 3-4 (Little, Brown, 3rd ed. 1986). The
pedigree of a neoclassical perspective (descriptive and normative) with respect to stockholders'
behavior is extensive. See, for example, Cone's Executors v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 849 (N.J. Ct. App.
1891); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 24 (Del. Ch. 1982); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional
Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1991).
Compare Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, If It Were
Really to Matter, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 557, 566, 571 (1986) (describing as the "anti's" arguments the
prevailing neoclassical philosophy that animates the principle of profit maximization and describ-
ing this position as the one prevailing in the literature); Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Inter-
pretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 Stetson L.
Rev. 163, 167 (1991). Wallman asserts:
The theory is plain: The desire for pecuniary gain on the part of shareholders will result in
the production through corporations of goods and services that society needs. The classical
capitalistic concept of the invisible hand will ensure that every individual "in pursuing his
own selfish good . . . [will] achieve the best good for all."
Id. For a more general statement of the importance of "classicism" in early American law, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 at 2. 3 (Harvard Univ., 1991).
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eliminate, or lessen the consequences of, conflicts arising from this nat-
ural behavior.'
In creating this structure, corporate law attempts to force into a
simplified and traditional bilateral mode 7 an inherently intricate and
complex web of relationships that exists within collectivities.' In short,
corporate law attempts to manage the collectivity by denying its exis-
tence. Law-and-economics scholars have, through the device of the
nexus of contracts, descriptively attempted to reintroduce some of the
complexity that exists within such organizations,' but have failed to im-
prove the traditional analysis because of their adherence to the assump-
tion that relationships exist only bilaterally. 10 Law-and-economics
scholars have conceived of this complex web as consisting of a series of
bilateral relationships in which each side bargains and competes with
the other in its own self-interest." As a result, they ignore both the
possibility of covariance among these relationships and the possibility
of altruistic or other nonutilitarian motivations for behavior.'
2
6. These rules, known under the general rubric of the duty of loyalty, are described gener-
ally in Henn and Alexander, Law of Corporations at 235-44 (cited in note 2). See also William L.
Cary and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations at 556-690 (Foundation, 6th
ed. 1988).
7. The pervasiveness of the bilateral model of legal relations in American law is demon-
strated in Hohfeld's exposition on the subject of basic juridical concepts, analyzed in terms of
correlatives and opposites. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16 (1913).
8. For a recent attempt (including a survey of the philosophical literature) to examine the
uniquely organizational characteristics of the corporation, see Jeffrey Nesteruk, Legal Persons and
Moral Worlds: Ethical Choices Within the Corporate Environment, 29 Am. Bus. L. J. 75 (1991).
See also Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic
Society (Univ. of Cal. 1986).
9. For general discussions of the nexus-of-contracts theory, see William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471,
1513 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
99, 110-22 (Summer 1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Cor-
porate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1396-97, 1408, 1426, 1449-57, 1487, 1536, 1550-51, 1590, 1620,
1764-74 (1989).
10. See, for example, Butler, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 110-22 (cited in note 9) (describing
the contractual characteristics of the corporation).
11. The assumption that individuals are rational utility maximizers lies at the heart of neo-
classical economics. Amartya K. Sen, On Ethics and Economics at 15 (Oxford, 1987). See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 993, 1014
(1990) (discussing early institutionalist economics' rejection of this assumption). For a relatively
complete attempt to apply this perspective generally to corporate law, see Frank H. Easterbrook
and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard Univ., 1991).
12. For economic models that accept the role of altruism in motivating behavior, see Amitai
Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (Free, 1988); Roland N. McKean, Eco-
nomics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility, in Edward S. Phelps, ed., Altruism,
Morality and Economic Theory at 29 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1975). See also Nesteruk, 29 Am.
Bus. L. J. at 75 (cited in note 8); Stanley, 19 Cambrian L. Rev. at 101-08 (cited in note 3); Stone,
71 Iowa L. Rev. at 571 (cited in note 5) (objecting to setting the terms of the corporate responsibil-
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By hypothesizing and describing this bilateral and competitive
model, both legal doctrine and the law-and-economics model create and
perpetuate a particular set of expectations and course of behavior. Be-
cause they posit bilateral relationships, the effects of all other relation-
ships on the two dominant relationships are made to seem peripheral at
best 13 and irrelevant at worst."' By assuming competitive behavior, they
deny the relevance, if not the possibility, of other forms of behavior,
while at the same time defining the central legal problem as the re-
straint of management's competition with stockholders. And by re-
straining competitive behavior within the corporation while at the same
time encouraging competition in all other areas, they ensure that the
costs of restraining competition will be borne by all but the noncompet-
ing groups.1" Finally, and most importantly, by focusing on restraining
management-stockholder competition as the central concern of corpo-
rate law, both traditional legal doctrine and law-and-economics scholars
encourage corporate management to expend its energies demonstrating
that it is not, in fact, competing with the stockholders. In other words,
in the corporate context, managers prevent their ouster by election or
takeover, or their discipline by derivative litigation, by constantly and
publicly demonstrating their devotion to stockholder interests. 16 To do
this, management must divert its focus from its primary task of ensur-
ing corporate success in long-term competition with other corporations
and instead focus on achieving short-term profits and high current
stock prices.17
ity debate on the basis of utilitarianism). Even some neoclassical economists have recognized the
limitations this behavioral assumption places on their ability to explain all human behavior. See,
for example, Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 339, 345 (1988)
(noting the inability of economics to explain why persons with life tenure work rather than "play a
lot of golf'); id. at 363 (noting the difficulty of explaining why people vote).
13. See, for example, ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 2.01 at 69 (cited in note 1);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that the board may
consider the impact of takeover on a variety of constituencies); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbe.s Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (interpreting Unocal as permitting constitu-
ency consideration only if "rationally related benefits" accrue to stockholders); Mills Acquisition
C o. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1988) (same).
14. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (stating that the only appropriate object of directorial concern
when the sale of a corporation is inevitable is the stockholders).
15. See notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
16. Christopher Stone sees share values and freedom from litigation as management's proxy
for success. Stone, 71 Iowa L. Rev. at 569 (cited in note 5).
17. It is noteworthy in this context that many financial measures of successful management
are keyed either to current profitability or stock price. I discuss this fact in evaluating certain
empirical data in note 204. Although the efficient capital market hypothesis would suggest that
current stock prices reflect a current perception of the corporation's long-term prospects, both the
hypothesis and this implication are subject to some controversy. See, for example, Richard A.
Booth, Di.scounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1055, 1064-78 (1991);
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This imperative for management to focus on short-term profits is a
perennial problem in corporate governance, and I wish to expand upon
this theme by using these insights."' The distortions caused by the inac-
curate description of internal corporate dynamics embodied in tradi-
tional legal doctrine and by the narrow and arid analysis of such
dynamics canonized by law-and-economics theorists are an important
cause of the fundamental failure of American corporations to provide
for their own long-term health. Put differently, the short-term focus of
American corporations can be traced, at least in part, to the essential
failure of American private-law jurisprudence, when applied to internal
corporate governance, to create and sustain a realistic theory of the col-
lectivity that maximizes group welfare.' 9 Instead, our law attempts to
Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891, 898-99 (1988).
18. Corporate governance reform has been a recurrent theme in corporate scholarship and
practice. Descriptions of various corporate governance reform movements can be found in Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 (1982); Bayless Manning,
A Taxonomy of Corporate Law Reform, in Donald E. Schwartz, ed., Commentaries on Corporate
Structure and Governance at 109 (A.L.I.-A.B.A., 1979); Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 Yale L.
J. 1477 (1958); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers v. Institu-
tions, 59 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 357 (1990).
Recently there has been a resurgent interest in corporate governance reform, stimulated by
the recognized predominance of institutional investors. For leading examples and reform propos-
als, see, Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C.
L. Rev. 1135 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991); Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 187 (cited in note 2); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Con-
trol in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881; Sommer, Corporate Governance at 357
(cited in this note); Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates (cited in note 2); Robert G. Monks and Nell
Minow, Power and Accountability (Harper Business, 1991). In 1986, Myles L. Mace published an
updated edition of his now classic study, Directors, Myth and Reality (Harv. Bus. School, 1986),
reaffirming the conclusions he reached in 1971 as to the actual role of corporate directors. See
notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
19. Some nascent recognition of the problems caused by this failing is implicit in the increas-
ing popular and scholarly interest in Japanese keiretsus. See, for example, Seminar Examines Op-
eration and Impact of Keiretsu System, 61 (BNA) No. 1541 at 616 (Nov. 14, 1991); Paul Blustein,
Japan's Corporate Connections Create Challenge for U.S. Businesses, Wash. Post Al (Oct. 6,
1991); Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, Fortune 76 (Jul. 15, 1991); Angelina Helou,
The Nature and Competitiveness of Japan's Keiretsu, J. World Trade 99 (June 1991); Richard
Nanto, Japan's Industrial Groups: The Keiretsu (1990); Marie Anahordoguy, A Brief History of
Japan's Keiretsu, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 58 (Jul.-Aug. 1990), and their apparent success. I say "appar-
ent" success because there is some suggestion that the keiretsu is not as successful as it appears.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Moni-
tor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1298-1302 (1991).
Peter Drucker argues that a major reason for the long-term growth and success of Japanese
business has been the conscious adoption of a policy and culture of cooperation among conflicting
groups within the business and corporate structure. Peter F. Drucker, Behind Japan's Success, 59
Harv. Bus. Rev. 83, 86 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). My proposal is based on the premise that adopting corpo-
rate rules and structures that foster cooperation, rather than maintaining our current rules and
structures which foster confrontation and exclusion, will similarly benefit American business.
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organize the collectivity around the individualistic and self-interested
struggles upon which American capitalism is based.
I have analyzed elsewhere some of the specific, real-world intracor-
porate relationships that have reflected this narrow legal understanding
of group relationships, and suggested other ways of analyzing these re-
lationships (using traditional legal concepts, untraditionally applied)
that might reduce internal corporate conflict and promote more just,
and therefore more desirable, group behavior.20 But in doing so, I have
failed to develop ways in which these broadened ideas of corporate
community could be infused within the day-to-day functioning of the
corporation, rather than in an episodic manner requiring legal enforce-
ment. In this Article I will attempt to cure this failure by focusing on
the structure and duties of the central corporate constituent group, the
board of directors. Rather than reject the traditional centrality of the
board, I will, in the somewhat conservative discursive mode of the cor-
porate literature, demonstrate how the board can fulfill a critical man-
agement and monitoring function while also recognizing and rewarding
as central and vital to the corporation all of the constituent groups
upon whom its long-term survival depends. In doing so, I reject for the
internal corporate governance model both the bilateral structure of
traditional corporate law and the insistence upon individualistic compe-
tition associated with law-and-economics theorists and implied by the
structure of corporate law.2
This is a critical time for the reexamination of the principles upon
which corporate governance is based. The overwhelming concentration
of corporate equities in the hands of institutional investors,22 the tenta-
20. See Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 582-603 (cited in note 2); Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at
1177-86 (cited in note 4). I have taken a different approach in the very different context of close
corporations. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1675 (1990).
21. In this respect I depart significantly from other reform proposals, all of which are (more
or less) predicated on the traditional model. See Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 881 (cited in note 18);
Gilson and Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 863 (cited in note 18); Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 187 (cited in note 2); Monks and Minow, Power and Accountability (cited in note 18);
Edward D. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 Geo. L. J. 445 (1991). One major problem with these reformers is that they focus on the form,
rather than the substance, of corporate governance. For an interesting case study supporting the
conclusion that formal restructuring alone is inadequate to result in true reform, see Lesley Levy,
Reforming Board Reform, 59 Harv. Bus. Rev. 166 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). But see Barnard, 69 N.C. L.
Rev. at 1170 (cited in note 18) (noting that social scientists have concluded that improving deci-
sion-making processes can improve results).
22. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 567
(1990); Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotol Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A
Summary of Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project (1990); Buxbaum,
57 Brook. L. Rev. at 16-18 (cited in note 5); Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1291-92 (cited in note 19).
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tive but increasing corporate activism of those investors,2 3 and the over-
whelming embrace of these developments by corporate scholars as the
panacea for what ails American corporations,2 4 suggests that the oppor-
tunity to deconstruct and reconstruct corporate governance may soon
be past.
It is with this sense of urgency that I suggest in this Article a
model for reconceptualizing the board of directors. The model consists
of two parts. The first, related (although indirectly) to the problems
caused by corporate bilateralism, addresses the longstanding scholarly
concern that the board performs no useful function in corporate law. 5
23. Barnard, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1152-56 (cited in note 18); Buxbaum, 57 Brook. L. Rev. at 22
(cited in note 5); Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time For A Federal Corporation Law?, 57 Brook. L.
Rev. 55, 68-69 (1991); Victories of Governance Proposals Rose By Significant Margin in 1990,
Study Says, 6 Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA) 2 (Oct. 30, 1991).
Some of the flavor of this activism is provided in Rock, 79 Geo. L. J. at 1357 (cited in note 21).
On October 4, 1991, the CEO of the California Public Employees' Retirement System
("CalPERS"), "[tihe nation's largest institutional investor," announced that CaIPERS would
abandon the use of stockholder proposals to influence corporate governance and instead seek di-
rect negotiations with individual corporations in order to avoid public scrutiny. CalPERS to Drop
Shareholder Proposals, Sec. Law Daily (BNA) (Oct. 7, 1991).
Institutions also have exerted significant pressures on legislators in order to increase their
voice in corporate governance. Both the United Shareholders Association and CalPERS have peti-
tioned the Securities Exchange Commission to change the current proxy regulations in favor of
greater stockholder participation. Petition of the United Shareholders Association, dated and filed
Mar. 20, 1990; Letter from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporate Finance,
dated Jul. 25, 1990. Other institutional action has been aimed at preventing dimunition of stock-
holder voices. As a result of the enactment of Pennsylvania's new antitakeover law diminishing the
effect of stockholder pressure on directors of Pennsylvania corporations, several institutional inves-
tors expressed doubts as to whether they would continue to invest in Pennsylvania corporations.
Foe Studying Takeover Act, N.Y. Times D4 (Aug. 24, 1990); Leslie Wayne, Takeovers Face New
Obstacles, N.Y. Times Dl (Apr. 19, 1990); Diana B. Henriques, A Paradoxical Anti-Takeover Bill,
N.Y. Times D15 (Apr. 8, 1990); Gregory A. Robb, SEC Chief Criticizes Bill to Thwart Takeovers,
N.Y. Times D2 (Apr. 3, 1990).
24. See Barnard, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1135 (cited in note 18); Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1277
(cited in note 19) (with some reservation as to practicality); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerial-
ism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 117 (1988); Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 881 (cited
in note 18); Gilson and Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 863 (cited in note 18); Lipton and Rosen-
blum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 190 (cited in note 2) (proposing to make the proxy system accessible to
the corporation's largest stockholders); Monks and Minow, Power and Accountability (cited in
note 18); Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 525 (cited in note 22) (deferring to a forthcoming article the
question of the desirability of stockholder monitoring but suggesting its possibility); Rock, 79 Geo.
L. J. at 452 (cited in note 21) ("reluctantly" concluding, however, that efficiency of institutional
hegemony is limited.) Even if institutional activism has been hampered and thus far has not had
overwhelming effect because of the current structure of legal rules, see, for example, Mark Roe,
Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 7,
9-21 (1990), the fact that the overwhelming majority of academics who have written on the subject
have encouraged the destruction of these barriers is cause enough for the concern that they may
soon erode, resulting in the reality of increased institutional activism. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates
(cited in note 2), is the notable exception in opposing institutional activism.
25. Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 914 (cited in note 18) (noting the problem of what to do with
the board and identifying commentators who have raised the issue). As I will discuss in notes 40-43
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After analyzing this claim and examining the evidence, I conclude that
it is correct and suggest that the solution lies in differentiating the
board's duties from those of full-time managers. My answer to this ar-
gument is to make the board exclusively responsible for the corpora-
tion's capital structure (including its broad employment structure) and
for the distribution of the corporation's assets (including, broadly, the
compensation of its employees).26
The second part addresses the problem of short-term manage-
ment.17 It does so by focusing on the root causes, internal bilateralism
and accompanying text, the major cause of board dormancy is the board's co-option by manage-
ment. James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83, 91-99 (Summer
1985); Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 909 (cited in note 18); Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuring the
Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 583-86 (1978).
See generally, Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates (cited in note 2); Mace, Directors (cited in note 18).
26. In this formal respect, my proposal bears some superficial resemblance to the German
model of corporate governance. See, for example, Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to
Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2150, 2183 (1991); Gouter J. Roth, Corporate
Social Responsibility: European Models, 30 Hastings L. J. 1433, 1453 (1979); Clive M. Schmitt-
hoff, Social Responsibility in European Company Law, 30 Hastings L. J. 1419, 1426 (1979). The
idea of separate board functions also bears some resemblance to the very different proposals of
Nader, Green and Seligman. See Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant
Corporation at 118-31 (Norton, 1976) (advocating creating the board as an independent monitor
with specific social responsibilities and enhanced stockholder oversight).
By employment structure and compensation I mean (i) the hiring, compensation, and firing of
top executives, (ii) the structure of employee compensation generally, with particular attention to
noncash programs such as ESOPs and pension plans, and (iii) the supervision of the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements. These broad issues seem to present the greatest potential for the
types of conflicts I describe below, and require a relatively low level of corporation-specific exper-
tise. Most hiring and specific compensation decisions will, necessarily, be left to management for
the reasons I describe below.
27. Short-termism is the predominant concern among contemporary reformers. See, for ex-
ample, Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1282-83 (cited in note 19); Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 919-24
(cited in note 18); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5-9, 23-28 (1987); Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates (cited in note 2); Monks and
Minow, Power and Accountability at 251 (cited in note 18). An excellent statement of the problem
(as well as an interesting theory as to its causes) is provided by Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-
TermILong-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regula-
tion and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 137, 138-40 (1991).
An obvious relationship exists between the problem of short-termism and the corporate social
responsibility debate. See, for example, id. at 200 (stating that "[c]onsidering the interests of.. .
other constituencies is not only consistent with, but necessary for the long-term health of the cor-
poration"); Stone, 71 Iowa L. Rev. at 568-73 (cited in note 5). This is another of the predominant
reformist concerns that has sometimes framed the discourse. Fischel, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 (cited
in note 18); Manning, A Taxonomy of Corporate Law Reform (cited in note 18). Although I readily
admit that my goal is enhanced responsibility, it seems to me that such responsibility can best be
achieved within the limitations of the internal corporate framework by focusing on the problem of
enhancing long-term corporate well-being. Compare Fischel, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 1269 (cited in
note 18) (stating that "[s]ubstantial overlap exists . . . between the pursuit of profit maximization
and other social goals"). In fact, the clear implication of Lorsch's work, discussed in notes 121-33
and accompanying text, is that the two issues are directly related, a recognition that may unify the
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and competition, and demonstrates that the traditional model drains
management's energies, diverts its attention from long-term planning,
and results in the unjust imposition of the costs created by the model
on constituents external to the traditional legal corporate structure. An
important cause of this short-term focus is the stockholder-centric view
imposed upon management by traditional corporate law and reinforced
by the law-and-economics model. All other proposals suggest that
longer-term management be encouraged by strengthening the bonds be-
tween the board and the stockholders.28 My solution is to break these
bonds and to recast the board of directors as a mediating body among
the different corporate constituent groups. 9 In its new role as arbiter of
asset distribution, the board would be charged with the duty to ensure
that the corporation's assets are fairly distributed.30 To make this possi-
ble, I propose eliminating stockholder elections and making the board,
with certain limitations, a de jure self-perpetuating body.
In the course of developing this proposal, I will answer critics who
fear that an unelected and broadly charged board is an unaccountable
board, both by showing that their fears of managerial self-dealing
(which is partly cured by my redefinition of the board's duties) are ex-
aggerated and by introducing the principles and enforcement devices
that will encourage the board to act in the corporation's interest. The
end result of liberating the board from the stultifying constraints of the
bases of social utility and social responsibility identified by Hurst as undergirding the legitimacy of
American corporations. James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law
of the United States 1780-1970 (U. Va., 1970).
28. This central approach of enhancing board responsiveness to stockholders appears to have
some political appeal. After the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that it would
delay action on reforming proxy rules to ease stockholder communication, Senator William Cohen
introduced legislation to permit stockholder nomination of directors and enhance stockholder vot-
ing. Similar legislation is pending in both the House and Senate. Shareholders Could Nominate
Directors Directly Under Senate Bill, Sec. Reg. & L. Report (BNA) 1703 (Dec. 6, 1991).
29. For purposes of discussion, I assume that the constituent groups that should appropri-
ately receive directorial consideration are those which are identified by typical constituency stat-
utes. See, for example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(b) (McKinney, 1989) (identifying current
employees, "retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or entitled to receive" corporate
benefits, customers and creditors, and the communities in which the corporation does business).
Analysis of the correctness of this legislative choice is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. European company law has progressed significantly towards enhancing the responsibility
of corporate management to a wider variety of constituencies than the stockholders. Conard, 22
Mich. J. L. Ref. at 1286 (cited in note 24) (European Community law); Karmel, 57 Brook. L. Rev.
at 89 (cited in note 23) (same); Roth, 30 Hastings L. J. at 1436-41 (cited in note 26) (European
laws generally); Schmitthoff, 30 Hastings L. J. at 1431-32 (cited in note 26) (same); Clive M.
Schmithoff, Employee Participation and the Theory of the Enterprise, 1975 J. Bus. Law 265, 265-
66 (British law). A simple form of this balancing proposal was suggested by Schmitthoff. Id.
Wallman, 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 168-70 (cited in note 5), also argues that constituency legisla-
tion is likely to lead to more long-term corporate management. He argues that a "best interests of
the corporation" standard similarly will cast the board in the role of balancing among competing
constituent interests. Id. at 170.
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traditional legal model should be to empower it to fulfill the organiza-
tion's objectives in healthy competition with other organizations in the
neoclassical world.
II. THE NEW BOARD
It is the law of American corporations that the corporation's busi-
ness is to be managed by, or at least under the direction of, its board of
directors.3 1 It is now a platitude that the reality is different, at least in
the case of large and medium-size corporations. 2 In reality, manage-
ment 33 manages and the board rarely acts in even a supervisory
capacity.
34
Recent evidence of the board's dormancy is provided by Myles
Mace in a 1986 update of his classic study, Directors: Myth and Real-
ity,35 and to a lesser extent by Jay Lorsch in his book, Pawns or
Potentates." Mace identifies three functions commonly ascribed to cor-
porate boards37 and concludes that the typical board performs none of
these functions.38 Lorsch, who focuses on how well the board performs,
rather than whether it has a role to perform, credits directors with per-
forming more of the crisis functions that Mace believes they perform
only in rare cases, 39 but also sees them as performing a very limited
role.
In both studies, as well as others, the clear message is that boards
31. See, for example, Del. Code Ann. § 141(a) (1953); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701 (McKinney,
1961); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (1985).
32. Mace, Directors at 39-42 (cited in note 18). See also ALI Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance § 3.01 at 107 (cited in note 1) (stating "[t]he management of the business of a publicly held
corporation ... should be conducted by or under the supervision of such principal senior execu-
tives. . . as are designated by the board of directors"). Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corpora-
tion: A Legal Analysis at 140 (cited in note 2); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. Law 1477 (1984); Solomon, 76
Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86 (cited in note 25).
33. By "management" I mean the corporation's employees who are responsible for setting
and implementing corporate policy, including those employees who may serve on the board of
directors.
34. Both Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 97-167 (cited in note 2), and Mace, Directors at 39-
42 (cited in note 18), conclude, although to differing degrees, that the board performs some func-
tion in crisis situations, although both agree that boards in no sense manage the corporation's
business, and in fact are subordinate to management. It has been argued, however, that the board's
presence serves a sort of checking function. Mace, Directors at 23.
35. Mace, Directors.
36. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates.
37. The functions are (i) establishing basic corporate objectives, strategies, and policy, (ii)
asking discerning questions of management, and (iii) selecting the corporation's president. Mace,
Directors at 43.
38. Id. at 68.
39. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 97-167.
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fail to perform because they are co-opted by management. 40 This is true
whether or not the board includes a significant number, or even a ma-
jority, of outside directors.41 The reasons for this co-opting go well be-
yond the composition and socialization of boards (although these are
real and observed phenomena).42 Rather, they stem from the broad
truth that the board and management perform coterminous functions,
and everyone recognizes that management performs them better. 3
The primacy of management is not evident from the legal structure
of the corporation. Although some corporation statutes identify a role
for officers,44 most do not,45 and instead treat them as optional compo-
nents of corporate governance. Their existence and their duties are de-
fined by the board, which is an integral component of the statutory
scheme and which determines the number and type of officers and their
specific duties.46
The reality of modern corporations reverses this statutory scheme,
40. See, for example, Cox and Munsinger, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 91-99 (cited in note
25); Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86 (cited in note 25); Comment, The Propriety of Judicial
Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1894, 1898-1900 (1983).
41. A recent report by the Conference Board, surveying 589 medium to large corporations,
demonstrates that in 1989 the overwhelming majority of all manufacturing, financial, and nonfi-
nancial service corporations had boards with a majority of outside directors. The time period of
this report overlaps with that of Lorsch's survey. The Conference Board, Membership and Organi-
zation of Corporate Boards, Res. Report No. 940, at 9 (1990) ("Conference Board"). The Confer-
ence Board counted former employees as outside directors, but the Report also provides figures on
outside directors with this treatment reversed so that former employees are counted as insiders.
Even with this, however, the number of boards with a majority of outside directors, although sig-
nificantly reduced, is substantial. Id. at 2.
42. Brudney, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 610-13 (cited in note 2); John C. Coffee, Jr. and Donald E.
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 283 (1981); Cox and Munsinger, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 91-99
(cited in note 25); Dent, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. at 909 (cited in note 18); George W. Dent, Jr., The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75
Nw. U. L. Rev. 96, 121-22 (1980). Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), presents an
excellent example of a case in which the possibility of board co-option because of socialization was
pervasive. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-88 (Del. 1981), and Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1980), are two cases in which courts expressly
recognize the problem of structural bias.
43. Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 909 n.158 (cited in note 18), seems to recognize the causal
relationship. See also Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86 (cited in note 25); Comment, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. at 1898-99 (cited in note 40). See also Noyes E. Leech and Robert J. Mundheim, The
Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. Law. 1799, 1803-04 (1976). But see
Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions By the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1981) (surveying the literature on group dynamics, analyzing board behavior in
that light, and concluding that boards should be more active managers).
44. See, for example, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302.A.311 (West 1985) (specifying certain duties of
statutorily required officers but providing for further duties to be set forth in the charter, the by-
laws, or by board resolution).
45. Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.41, Statutory Comparison (1991). No statutes iden-
tify or describe roles for nonofficer employees.
46. See id. § 8.01.
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leaving no meaningful role for the board.47 The agency cost theorists
have, with little success, attempted to cast boards in the role of
monitors, whose existence reduces agency costs by ensuring managerial
diligence and fealty.48 But the heavy reliance of these theorists on the
market as a primary disciplining mechanism leaves a modest role for
the board as well, 49 a role insufficient to justify its importance in the
corporate legal framework. 50 Moreover, these theorists have never satis-
factorily answered the question of who will monitor the monitors. 51
If corporate governance required no more than managing business
operations, perhaps it would be time to recognize the board's obsoles-
cence and to do away with it as an institution. But there is more to
corporate governance, as can be seen by dividing the corporation's af-
fairs into two major categories: (i) operational matters, and (ii) struc-
tural and distributional matters. While these two categories necessarily
overlap,52 they address different problems and perhaps require different
47. This reality is described well in Haft, 80 Mich. L. Rev. at 1-3 (cited in note 43) and
Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 581 (cited in note 25).
48, Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 288 (cited in note 4). The term "agency costs" is used to define
the costs arising from the separation of functions within the corporation, including the cost in-
curred by stockholders in monitoring management, the cost of devices employed by management
to guarantee its loyalty ("bonding costs"), and the cost of self-dealing that is simply too expensive
to prevent. See William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Business Organization and Finance at 160-
63 (Foundation, 4th ed. 1990); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and
Res.idual Claims, 26 J. Law & Econ. 327, 327-49 (1983).
49. Harold Demsetz, The Monitoring of Management, in Statement of the Business Round-
table on the American Law Institute's Proposal "Principles of Corporate Governance and Struc-
ture: Restatement and Recommendations," B-1, B-b (ALI, 1983); Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 288
(cited in note 4); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J. Law & Econ. 301 (1983); Fischel, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1283-89 (cited in note 18).
50. Non-economists who favor a monitoring role for the board see its ultimate efficacy as
modest. Melvin A. Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 582, 596-98 (1984). Dent also seems to assume a monitoring role for the board, and
claims only modest improvement from his proposal, which is not directed at enhancing monitoring
so much as it is designed to make boards more responsive to stockholders. 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 911
(cited in note 18). He does suggest that his proposal would enhance directors' incentives to moni-
tor management. Id. at 912.
51. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
Yale L. J. 698, 701 (1982) (noting that "[flull time monitors become managers themselves, in all
but name, and monitors who do not work full time lack both the incentive to watch carefully and
the information to determine how well others are performing their tasks.") Fama's answer is the
market. Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 288 (cited in note 4). Rock identifies monitor monitoring as a
significant problem blocking the effective use of institutional investors to accomplish corporate
governance reform. Rock, 79 Geo. L. J. 445 (cited in note 21). Gilson and Kraakman amply demon-
strate this by adding yet another monitoring layer (which itself requires monitoring) to the corpo-
rate structure. Gilson & Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (cited in note 18). They argue that their
new monitoring structure will not create significant agency costs, id. at 890-91, & n.86, but their
reasoning seems unpersuasive given the history of the monitoring problem.
52. I deal with the issue and problem of overlap in more detail in notes 61-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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information levels and skills. A brief story will illustrate.
Greenacres Corporation is a medium-size public corporation en-
gaged in the manufacture of IBM-compatible personal computers.
Greenacres' capital structure consists exclusively of common stock, the
shares of which are listed on the American Stock Exchange. Greenacres'
board is fairly typical and includes three inside directors (one of whom
is president and CEO), and five outside directors. The board meets
monthly (except in August), and has a weekend-long retreat once every
two years at a conference center near the company's headquarters.
Greenacres is at a critical point in its corporate development.
Growth in the independent manufacture of IBM-compatible computers
is likely to be small, especially in light of the recent decision of IBM
and Apple Computers to work jointly to make their products compati-
ble.53 Software development (on which the company's research and de-
velopment department has been working) seems to promise greater
potential in terms of growth and profitability. Management wants to
enter the software business and is considering two options: developing
and marketing a product through a new subsidiary corporation, or ac-
quiring an existing company and its employees. To pursue either op-
tion, management believes it will need greater financial resources than
are available from the company's retained earnings and projected cash
flow.
Greenacres has never paid a dividend to its stockholders and has
issued no new stock since its initial public offering five years ago. In
addition, the company's stock price has remained fairly static, rising
and falling with the market for technology stocks generally. Finally,
management has established a pension plan and modest ESOP to pro-
vide for the company's 300 full-time employees.
Two different, if ultimately related, types of decisions confront
Greenacres. The first, dealing with the question of software develop-
ment and the issue of acquisition versus internal growth, is a matter of
business strategy and 'relates to the company's operating goals and
methods for attaining them. The second type of decision, how the funds
will be raised and what the relationship of new investors to the corpora-
tion's current stockholders will be, involves the company's capital struc-
ture and distribution of its assets. While the first set of decisions
requires intimate knowledge of the company's business, the abilities of
its employees, and the markets and industry in which it operates, the
second set of decisions does not. The second set of decisions requires
53. Ronald Rosenberg, IBM, Apple Take a Giant Step Into the Future, Boston Globe 33
(Oct. 3, 1991); Carla Lazzareschi, Rivals IBM, Apple Will Exchange Technologies, Los Angeles
Times Al (Jul. 4, 1991).
1276 [Vol. 45:1263
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
some financial sophistication and an appreciation of the company's fi-
nancial position, as well as a concern for balancing management's ambi-
tions against the rights and concerns of corporate claimants.
Importantly, the first set of decisions provides relatively little op-
portunity for managerial malfeasance. Consequently, it does not require
the rigorous oversight of an active board of directors. While manage-
ment may, as a group, shirk its duties-a fact that would be more or
less observable to an informed outsider, like an analyst-an active man-
agement will find little opportunity in the overall conduct of operations
and corporate strategy for personal enrichment. For example, although
managers might occasionally have the chance to usurp a corporate op-
portunity or engage in business relationships with the corporation, such
events are likely to be rare.54 More importantly, unlike decisions re-
garding either managerial compensation and perks or dividend policy,
operational decisions are not intimately related to the distribution of
the corporation's limited assets. Such decisions merely raise the possi-
bility that the corporation will be deprived of potentially profitable op-
portunities rather than that constituent groups will be deprived of a
portion of their rightful share of the corporation's assets . 5 Finally, and
importantly (as I shall discuss later), legally, if not morally, vali-
dated self-dealing behavior is an aspect of corporate life.
By contrast, decisions dealing with capital structure and asset dis-
tribution56 create significant conflicts of interest, not only between or
among management, employees, and security holders, but also between
or among current and future security holders and employees.57 Because
management always will depend upon the corporation for employment
54. That this is true at the board level is supported by the Conference Board report, which
indicates that, except for lawyers serving as directors, only a small minority of boards in each
category had directors who were employed by major customers, banks, investment banks, or sup-
pliers of the corporation on whose board they served. Conference Board at 9 (cited in note 41).
55. See also Fischel, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 1290 (cited in note 18) (stating that "[t]he impor-
tance of the derivative suit should not be exaggerated. . . . Management that consumes excessive
leisure or is not sufficiently diligent in choosing projects, or otherwise does not maximize share-
holders' wealth in any of an infinite number of ways short of fraud, has little to fear from the
derivative suit").
56. Asset distribution often entails the distribution of costs as well. See Mitchell, 70 Texas L.
Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the law permits externalization of costs as a by-product
of favoring stockholders). For example, a large distribution to stockholders may diminish the value
of outstanding debt or a merger resulting in substantial stockholder gains may result in the termi-
nation of employees. Thus, by the concept of distribution of assets, I also mean to include the
allocation of costs attendant upon such distributions.
57. I have analyzed elsewhere the types of conflicts that can occur within the corporation by
dividing them (roughly) into operational and distributional conflicts, which I term vertical and
horizontal conflicts. This division permits analysis of legal principles with a better understanding
of the problems they are designed to address. Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2);
Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1189-1215 (cited in note 4).
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and financial well-being, these conflicts cannot be eliminated. Most ob-
viously, management might try to expropriate an unfair share of the
corporation's assets by excessive salaries, perks, or incentive compensa-
tion arrangements. Management may prefer a potentially dilutive issue
of common stock to the acquisition of bank debt containing covenants
restricting management's discretion, thus further dispersing share own-
ership and further entrenching itself. Highly compensated top manage-
ment may also choose to underfund the company's pension plan to
increase retained earnings, thus limiting its exposure to the discipline of
financial markets. It may attempt an acquisition by issuing a new class
of securities, raising the possibility that it could obscure the true cost of
the acquisition and thus remain free from stockholder or market
challenge.
In addition, once the securities have been issued, management may
find itself in a position to benefit by recapturing some of the costs of
those securities.58 Management might prefer to retain earnings rather
than pay dividends, even if profitable investment opportunities are
lacking, in order to avoid the discipline of financial markets, or for a
variety of other self-serving reasons. 9 If financing is obtained through
the public issuance of debt, management will attempt to limit the in-
denture's covenants to a bare minimum, and may later attempt to de-
crease the cost of the debt by risk-taking or expropriating behavior that
falls through the indenture's thin covenants.60 Also, management may
attempt to repurchase securities (including debt, preferred or common
stock) on the market (for the ESOP or for retirement) when the price is
depressed or when the corporation's business is in a slump that it ex-
pects to be temporary.
None of the decisions that give rise to this possible opportunism
requires particular operational expertise. Rather, like capital structur-
ing decisions, they require a reasonable understanding of financial prin-
ciples, familiarity with the corporation's financial statements, and a
basic sense of decency and fairness. The typical board of directors pos-
58. By stating the problem in this way, I am implicitly suggesting bad faith conduct in terms
of the test developed by Steve Burton. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 387-92 (1980) (developing a test for
bad faith conduct in contract law as one party's attempting to recapture costs it has bargained
away).
59. See Booth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 1057 (cited in note 17); Kraakman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 897
n.21 (cited in note 17) (discussing reasons managers might prefer to retain earnings). See generally
Lawrence E. Mitchell and Lewis D. Solomon, Corporate Finance and Governance: Cases, Materi-
als and Problems for an Advanced Course in Corporations at 680-712 (1992).
60. This is made easy by the judicial treatment of bondholders' rights. Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1174-77 (cited in note 4); Mitchell and Solomon, Corporate Finance at 272-342 (cited in
note 59). For a discussion of the decline in covenant protection in modern indentures, see Morey
W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law. 413, 424-26 (1986).
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sesses all of these characteristics." Moreover, the board lacks manage-
ment's financial dependence upon the corporation and thus is not
subject to the same conflicts of interest, 2 except to the extent that
members of the board have financial interests in the corporation-a
problem easily eliminated-or, more importantly, identify socially and
psychologically with management-a problem that is likely to be re-
duced dramatically by the second part of my proposal. The one remain-
ing type of conflict to which directors ordinarily are, and under my new
set of duties would continue to be, subject are what Professor Eisenberg
calls "positional conflicts." These conflicts arise when directors are re-
quired to make decisions that might adversely affect their own incum-
bency. 3 In Part III of this Article, I resolve these potential conflicts by
eliminating the possibility that they will occur.
Looked at in this way, the board can perform a very significant
function in corporate governance. Whether as the initial planning body
or simply as a meaningful check on management, the board of directors
can have ultimate responsibility for determining the corporation's capi-
tal structure and for allocating its wealth. The modest understanding of
finance, and the relatively small amounts of time such decisions require,
as well as their ease of delegation to a small professional financial staff
reporting to the board, fits the amount of time and the nature of the
input that a generalist board composed largely of outside directors
brings to the job. This division of duties also diminishes the need to
monitor management by removing from management those decisions
that are most susceptible to conflicts of interest.
Under such a scenario, the board is unlikely to be co-opted by
management because its functions are qualitatively different from those
of management, and thus the board is not dependent upon, or necessa-
rily deferential to, management's expertise. For this reason, as well as
to ensure board independence, I would prohibit present and former cor-
porate employees from serving on the board. I would also prohibit di-
rectors from owning stock in the corporation to preclude the possibility
of financial conflicts of interest with other stockholders. In addition, the
external discipline of the federal securities laws should counteract any
incentive management might have to withhold or falsify information
necessary to the board,6 4 although a modest development of state statu-
tory and common-law principles will help to serve this goal. Moreover,
61. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 30 (cited in note 2); Mace, Directors at 109 (cited in note
18).
62. See Conference Board at 9 (cited in note 41).
63. Eisenberg, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1472 (cited in note 50).
64. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), illustrates the possible federal securi-
ties law consequences of giving withheld or falsified information to the board.
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if necessary, the board could employ a very small financial staff to meet
with management and analyze the corporation's financial needs.6 5
No proposal for governance reform is perfect. While my proposal
goes a long way towards removing some of the major conditions that
lead to board co-option and some of the opportunities for self-serving
conduct from both management and the board, some possibilities for
co-option will continue to exist. As Professor Brudney trenchantly put
the matter in assessing the utility of independent directors: "No defini-
tion of independence yet offered precludes an independent director
from being a social friend of, or a member of the same clubs. . . as, the
persons whose compensation or self-dealing transaction he is asked to
assess."66 The problem is exacerbated by the remarkable homogeneity
of boards,6 7 a homogeneity that I attempt to limit in the self-perpetuat-
ing board described in Part III. These factors could, for example, con-
tinue to make it difficult for a board to limit the compensation of the
corporation's CEO. However, once the functions and membership of the
board and management are separated, the self-perpetuating board I de-
scribe in Part III should partially ameliorate the effects of this problem.
One objection to this proposal, creating doubts about its likely effi-
cacy, may be that boards are charged under current law with precisely
those duties, among others, that I want it to deal with exclusively. In
fact, capital structuring and distributional issues are among those few
aspects of corporate governance dealt with expressly in most corpora-
tions statutes6s as a specific realm for the board-although the power is
sometimes shared with stockholders. Thus, the argument would go, all
my proposal does is to liberate management from board oversight in the
corporation's operations, while retaining the status quo as to structural
and distributional decisions.
This argument misconceives the nature of the board's co-option as
well as the extent to which my proposal would empower the board to
act as a meaningful independent governing body by liberating it from
management's domination. In the first place, the evidence seems clear
that boards are co-opted by management because they feel inferior to
management in the overall governance of the corporation.6 9 This co-op-
tion creates a boardroom atmosphere in which management board
65. According to the Conference Board report, a significant number of responding corpora-
tions already provide some staff assistance to the board. Conference Board at 37-39.
66. Brudney, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 613 (cited in note 2).
67. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 18 (cited in note 2); Conference Board at 10-12, Tables
10-13 (cited in note 41).
68. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. §§ 151-174, 251-253, 263, 271 (1983).
69. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 1-2 (cited in note 2); Mace, Directors at 185-86 (cited in
note 18); Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86 (cited in note 25).
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members, particularly the president or chairman, control both the flow
of information to, and the agenda of, the board with respect to both
operational decisions and structural and distributional decisions. While
it certainly is possible that aggressive managers could continue to exer-
cise some informational control over board members under my propo-
sal, the absence of managers on the board and the clear demarcation of
board and officer responsibilities would diminish this risk.
In addition, one reason the board is co-opted is its lack of time and
expertise to deal with all of the complexities of modern public corpora-
tion business. 70 Structural and distributional issues are part of the over-
all package of managerial and supervisory responsibilities with which
the board is charged, and thus exist somewhere in the morass of board
duties. Separating out these relatively less company-specific, or at least
more discrete, decisions would liberate the board to focus the time it
devotes to these matters and to deal only with the information neces-
sary to making an informed decision. If even this proves excessive, the
board could create a small corporate office, answerable directly to the
board-and perhaps even physically located away from corporate head-
quarters-to digest the relevant information and assist the board in its
decision-making. This suggestion is considerably more modest, and
therefore more manageable, than earlier suggestions to create a board
staff to monitor operations.71
Again, no solution is perfect. Business life rarely presents the sim-
plified dichotomy between operating and financing decisions that I have
described thus far.72 For example, the decision to retain earnings rather
than pay dividends ideally presupposes the availability of profitable in-
vestment opportunities for the corporation. Under my model, manage-
ment will be responsible for developing investment proposals and can,
through the use of particular projections and discount rates, present op-
timistic information that leads the board to agree to retain earnings to
management's benefit.73 Of course nothing in my proposal is meant to
release the board from its duty of care, including its duty of inquiry.
This may serve as a check on management, although recent experience
with the duty of care suggests that its sanctions serve as a weak incen-
70. Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86.
71. See Nader, Green, and Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation at 121 (cited in note 26)
(suggesting that boards should be staffed with "a trim group of attorneys, economists, and labor
and consumer advisors").
72. Nevertheless, financial theory strongly suggests that investment and financing decisions
ought to be kept separate. Mitchell and Solomon, Corporate Finance at 133 (cited in note 59).
73. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 323 (1986) (discussing reasons for management's retention of earn-
ings.). See also note 58.
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tive.7 -4 More to the point, however, legal rules have a limited ability to
constrain persons who choose to act in bad faith. My proposal for a
reconceived board would not prevent bad faith conduct. By eliminating
most of the conditions that lead to co-option, however, it would signifi-
cantly limit the board's automatic deference to management.
My proposal would leave management unsupervised in the corpora-
tion's operations, and thereby formalize the current effective absence of
supervision. It might seem that board oversight of managerial decision-
making should be strengthened rather than weakened. Such a response,
however, would do nothing to alleviate, and possibly would increase, the
problem of co-option. In order for boards to exercise meaningful over-
sight of corporate operations, they would have to obtain the informa-
tion and ask the probing questions that they thus far have failed to
do.", The fact that boards (including outside directors) have subordi-
nated themselves to management under the current monitoring model,
and the reasons they have done so,76 strongly suggest that pursuing
some form of this model will result in failure.
Moreover, while my proposal results in substantial board indepen-
dence, it does not result in similar independence for management. A
corporation often cannot undertake substantial new business without
financing. The board's control over management's access to financing,
including the corporation's retained earnings, will be an effective check
on management."' Moreover, the removal of compensation and distribu-
tional decisions from management's purview is the removal of much of
the temptation to self-deal. Finally, top management will be replaceable
by the board and will be disabled from using financial manipulation,
74. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. Law. 1207, 1243-45 (1988); Karmel, 57 Brook.
L. Rev. at 73 (cited in note 23).
Although the issue is beyond the scope of this Article,-the new duties of the board, if imple-
mented as law, create the need for a reexamination of the strength and applicability of the busi-
ness judgment rule to these board decisions.
75. Fischel calls the distinction between monitoring and management "more apparent than
real," suggesting that monitoring requires at least as much knowledge of the corporation's business
as running it. 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 1282 (cited in note 18).
76. See Cox and Munsinger, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 85-131 (cited in note 25); Dent,
1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 883-84 (cited in note 18); Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates (cited in note 2);
Mace, Directors (cited in note 18); Solomon, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 583-86 (cited in note 25).
77.. This may be seen as sneaking in through the back door the balance of the board's current
duties that my proposal seeks to take away from the board. This is not my intent; it arises from
the obvious interrelationship between operating and financing decisions. To the extent it causes
concern, it perhaps can be dealt with by requiring the board to finance-in some fashion-all
management proposals, subject to a rationality and conflicts of interest test. The board's liability
for the wisdom of such decisions might need to be adjusted accordingly, although the board's cur-
rent exposure is so weak, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), that no serious adjust-
ment would need to be made.
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accomplished through financial structuring and distributional decisions,
to mask its successes and failures.
In short, I believe this proposal, unlike others, is directly respon-
sive to the problems that have resulted in board passivity and ineffi-
cacy. In order for the proposal to work, however, the public and the
board must reach a consensus on the overall purpose of public corpora-
tions, as well as the identity of those who are included within its struc-
ture. As a gapingly broad base line generality, virtually everyone can
agree that the corporation exists to enhance the welfare of our society.78
In practice, this has meant that corporations exist principally to in-
crease stockholder wealth. I turn next to the failings of this precept in
order to identify and describe the goals of the reconceptualized board.
III. STOCKHOLDER-CENTRISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SHORT-TERM
Focus
The problem of short-term managerial focus in American corpora-
tions is caused in large part by the legal and practical pressures on di-
rectors and managers to look exclusively to the interests of
stockholders, resulting in managerial obsession with current profitabil-
ity and stock price. In this section, I will first describe the processes by
which legal principles and devices work to create this short-term focus,
arguing that the unreality of the traditional corporate model underlies
the problem. I will next look at the way the rise in institutional investor
stock ownership is certain to exacerbate this problem of short-termism
as long as the traditional model continues. I will next examine recent
empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that directors believe that
corporate management would be made more rational and effective by
expanding directors' focus. I will conclude the section by arguing that
the primary underlying rationale of the traditional model, preventing
directorial self-dealing, is no longer a valid concern of legal or public
policy.
78. Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College case established that this is the purpose for
which all corporations are created. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 250, 304
(1819); G. Michael Epperson and Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity:
Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and
Virginia, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 626 (1988); John H. Bryan, Jr., The Corporation and the Execu-
tive in the Community, 1987 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 695, 696 (stating that "[t]he primary purpose of
business-and of a corporation-is only, and simply, to serve society in the most efficient man-
ner"). See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L. J. 201, for an explanation of
the historical manifestations of this precept.
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A. The Force of the Law and Stockholder Profit: A World of Black
and White
At this point in our legal history, there is no serious dispute over
the proposition that corporate managers' duties are owed to the stock-
holders.79 Although the traditional doctrinal formulation-which con-
tinues in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governances-directs those duties to the corporation (either exclu-
sively or in addition to the stockholders), the application of such duties
reflects purely a stockholder-centric view."' As I have argued elsewhere,
this view is compounded by the fact that enforcement mechanisms are
available exclusively to stockholders, as well as the fact that stockhold-
ers are the sole voting constituents in the election of directors and the
only constituents able to effect a change in control through the sale of
the corporation.2 Thus, it seems clear that any suggestions that the
law, as currently formulated and applied, permits consideration of non-
stockholder interests in any meaningful way can be put to rest. My
point is not to rehash this argument. Rather, my intention is to show
that this generally accepted bilateral model-of corporate law is precisely
the cause of directors' excessive focus on the short term.
As I suggested earlier, corporate law has eliminated the potential
79. Brudney, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 602 (cited in note 2). Lorsch notes that some corporate
lawyers have suggested that the law is broader than this, Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 53 (cited
in note 2). However, no court, to my knowledge, has squarely endorsed the view that directors may
consider the interests of other constituent groups without reference to stockholder profit in the
general management of the corporation. Certainly there has been some motion in this direction.
See, for example, ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 6.02, at 547 (cited in note 1) (stating
that "the board may [in evaluating takeovers] . . . have regard for interests or groups (other than
shareholders) with respect to which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not
significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders"). The proliferation of constituency
legislation heralds the possibility of a much broader directorial view. Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at
588-610 (cited in note, 2). However, the ALI principle is not yet law, see ALI Principles of Corpo-
rate Governanc § 6.02 at 578, Reporter's Note 2, even in its rather modest formulation, and con-
stituency statutes are too new to have been tested in a meaningful way. But see Baron v.
Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (construing the predecessor to
Pennsylvania's constituency statute); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091-97 (10th Cir.
1972) (stating that directors who establish an employee stock option plan pursuant to Colorado
law are protected by the business judgment rule even though the purchase of stock for the plan
and the transfer of treasury stock to the plan caused the corporation to lose money).
For a recent, well-reasoned argument in favor of stockholder-centrism based on financial the-
ory, see Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA
L. Rev. 277, 320-27 (1990).
80. ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 2.01 at 69 (cited in note 1).
81. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Cor-
porate Law, 68 Texas L. Rev. 865, 900-931 (1990). I have taken the term "stockholder-centrism"
from Johnson. Id. Professor Millon notes that the doctrinal distinction between the corporation's
interests and those of the stockholders "has never been explained," at least as a matter of Dela-
ware jurisprudence. Millon, 1990 Duke L. J. at 255 (cited in note 78).
82. Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2).
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internal complexity and turmoil of the corporation by limiting the defi-
nition of the corporation to two meaningful groups: stockholders and
directors. It assumes that, absent restraint, directors (as humans) will
act in their own best interests rather than in those of the stockholders,
who lack power to protect themselves. Consequently, the law regulates
conflicts that might arise between these groups by mandating that di-
rectors act in the stockholders' interests, thus creating a world of black
and white. Under the rules defining this mandate, two courses of action
are available to directors: action that enhances stockholder wealth, and
action that does not. Dismissing for the moment the dormant duty of
care,83 actions that enhance stockholder wealth are consistent with di-
rectorial responsibilities. Actions that do not enhance stockholder
wealth are not, and constitute self-dealing or some more subtle form of
breach of fiduciary duty."4 Except in the relatively limited (and cur-
rently unimportant) area of takeover defenses in Delaware, there is no
middle ground. 5 The world is one of good and bad.
Thus is created the environment in which corporate governance oc-
curs, a bilateral environment in which maximizing its own material
well-being is presumed to be the goal of each side. The simplicity of
this world permits a choice to be made, and that choice is made in the
law by deeming the stockholders' interests to be the only ones that mat-
ter, through the fiction of calling stockholders the "owners" of the cor-
83. The dormancy of the duty of care as a meaningful check on directorial conduct, at least
so far as the threat of actual liability is concerned, has been noted often, with the classic articula-
tion in Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L. J. 1078 (1968). Equally noted (although more re-
cently) is the rush of state legislatures to provide statutorily authorized hold-harmless clauses for
directors breaching their duty of care following Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), in
which both the inside and outside directors of a Delaware corporation were held liable for damages
following a finding that they had breached their duty of care. See generally Hanks, 43 Bus. Law. at
1207 (cited in note 74).
84. The business judgment rule gives directors substantial latitude within these parameters.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d. Cir. 1982). Nonetheless, action taken within the boundaries of
that rule is required to be in the best interests of the corporation, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984), which, as I discuss in notes 86-97 and accompanying text, means the best interests
of stockholders. Directorial discretion is thus directed towards the choice of means to achieve this
goal rather than the goal itself, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919),
although recent cases have suggested a questioning of this goal. See Millon, 1990 Duke L. J. at 251-
61 (cited in note 78); Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2).
85. The middle ground in Delaware derives from the combination of the Unocal standard of
judicially reviewing defensive tactics, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247, 249-60 (1989), which
expressly permits the board to consider the interests of other constituencies, and the opinion in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), in which the court
refused to interfere with the judgment of the board in resisting a hostile tender offer in the inter-




poration. As I have argued elsewhere,8" this labelling technique has
successfully resulted in the corollary that the interests of no group
other than the stockholders is relevant to corporate law. Careful analy-
sis reveals that the relationship between many of these other constitu-
ent groups and corporate managers exhibits the characteristics of a
fiduciary relationship,87 a proposition generally unacknowledged in cor-
porate law.
In this world, it is essential both to the directors'-survival and their
freedom from litigation that they display themselves to be working in
the stockholders' interests. Any other behavior is characterized as self-
dealing (by which I mean all actions not taken in the stockholders' in-
terests). Directors are punished for self-dealing by electoral removal,
hostile takeovers, or derivative litigation. Although none of these is
likely to happen to a particular board of directors, their aggregate pres-
sure, at least theoretically, disciplines directors to act in the stockhold-
ers' interests.8
Unfortunately, characterizing directorial actions as stockholder
wealth-enhancing or self-dealing is not so easy in specific cases. This is
because the business world is not as orderly as the world of legal doc-
trine. 9 In the business world, actions may be taken that temporarily
deprive the corporation of profit, or defer profit, in the interests of
long-term gain. The long-term gain might be direct, in that enhanced
earnings are anticipated as a result of a particular project, or indirect,
for example, in the cementing of a relationship with an important sup-
plier or customer." These actions might result in lower share prices, el
86. Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2).
87. Id. See also Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1177-78 (cited in note 4). For my view of the
general characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, see Fiduciary Duty at 1684-87 (cited in note 2).
88. In recent years the hostile takeover mechanism has been seen to be the principal discipli-
nary mechanism, particularly by those of the law and economics stripe. Easterbrook and Fischel,
Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 171-74 (cited in note 11).
89. In fact, the history of corporate law largely is the history of judicial and legislative ac-
commodation to the needs of an industrializing society. See Hurst, Business Corporation at 22-27,
39-40 (cited in note 2,7).
Wallman argues that one reason the stockholder-centric model fails is because of the diversity
of different interests existing within a group of public stockholders. 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 173-77
(cited in note 5).
90. Stone notes that situations may often exist in which no "most profitable" alternative
exists, or at least not clearly so. Stone, Corporate Social Responsbility at 588 (cited in note 5).
91. Assuming the existence of market imperfections answers those in the law-and-economics
camp who would argue that the long-term advantages to the corporation from taking these actions,
translated into corporate earnings, will be discounted by the market and impounded in the stock
price such that the stock price will not in fact drop. Regardless of how one feels about the efficient
capital market hypothesis, sufficient theoretical and empirical doubt exists to permit such an as-
sumption to be made easily. See Booth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 1064-78 (cited in note 17); Kraakman, 88
Colum. L. Rev. at 898-99 (cited in note 17).
More importantly, the very real practical pressures on institutions to demand high current
1286 [Vol. 45:1263
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and probably will result in diminished net income. A sense of fairness
may even motivate a board to interpret liberally a bond contract or a
union contract, in a manner that might cost stockholders some wealth
or forego some gain, in order to compensate for the harsh effects of a
particular transaction or even to redress a contractual omission not in-
tended or foreseen by either side.92 Finally, cases exist in which self-
dealing might be efficient, for example, as when a director who owns a
general contracting business undertakes to supervise construction for
the corporation as the least-cost provider. 3
The difficulty is in evaluating whether this conduct is good or bad
for the corporation. 4 The determination is more easily made, at least in
an immediate way, from the perspective of the stockholders, for if stock
prices or earnings drop, they will suffer an immediate decrease in
wealth, leading to the conclusion that the board's conduct was bad. It
may well be that, with full information, skill, and ability, stockholders
would understand these decisions to be "correct" in a long-run eco-
nomic sense-or in an ethical sense, but stockholders are not in the same
position as directors to evaluate these considerations. Consequently,
stock prices and financial statements become a surrogate for directorial
performance.9 5 Given these facts, and the fact that distinguishing those
actions that are bad from those that are neutral, at least, is difficult
without significant information (or hindsight), directors have an incen-
dividends, see notes 113-19 and accompanying text, coupled with the illiquidity of institutional
positions, Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (cited in note 19), suggests that current distributions are
the only relevant form of wealth-enhancement to institutional investors, and the assumption of
market imperfections is unnecessary.
92. The ALI would permit boards to act from such fairness concerns without a demonstra-
tion even of long-run stockholder gain in a very limited variety of circumstances. ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance § 2.01 at 69, § 6.02 at 547 (cited in note 1).
93. See, for example, Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1972) (Bussey
dissenting).
94. This difficulty in separating the good from the bad is analogous to the difficulty of evalu-
ating fiduciary breaches in terms of subjective motivation that has led courts to focus on objective
considerations when deciding these matters. Compare, for example, AC Acquisitions Corp. v. An-
derson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that objective fairness rather
than subjective intent or belief is the test).
95. Easterbrook and Fischel, two of the most fundamentalist adherents of the law-and-eco-
nomics movement, view this obsession with share price as both descriptively and normatively cor-
rect. Frank J. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. Law. 1733, 1744 (1981). Of course this flows from their faith in the
notion of efficient markets and properly discounted share prices. Id. at 1743. See also Stone, 71
Iowa L. Rev. at 569 (cited in note 5). As to financial statements, a great deal of recent criticism has
been levied at accounting-based concepts of financial well-being. See, for example, Tom Copeland,
Tim Koller, and Jack Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wi-
ley, 1990). In fact, cash-flow-based methods of valuation have achieved primacy in Delaware since
they were permitted by the court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See, for
example, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990); In re Shell Oil Co.,
1990 WL 201390 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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tive at the time actions are taken to make them appear to be as benefi-
cial to stockholders as possible. In their voting and selling capacities,
stockholders can bring significant pressure to bear on managers that
instill in them an incentive to avoid demonstrably actions that in this
world appear to be bad. This produces the well-known risk averseness
of corporate managers,96 and a focus on stock prices and earnings
statements.
Thus, a predicate question to each corporate action necessarily is:
How will it look to the stockholders? And as Lorsch demonstrates-and
as I shall discuss shortly-one need not assume that management
desires to avoid punishment to recognize the centrality of this question.
Directors seem to believe that their legal duty is to the stockholders.
97
This narrow legal model was hardly inevitable. Case law occasion-
ally acknowledges a "community of interests" in the corporation, 8 and
even a casual observer would readily realize that a corporation consist-
ing exclusively of directors and stockholders is unlikely to be competi-
tive.9 At a minimum, the corporation requires employees, customers,
suppliers, and the like for its survival. But corporate law does not rec-
ognize these groups as part of the corporation.
-In fact, corporate law permits directors to externalize the costs of
benefitting stockholders on other corporate constituent groups. 100 By
creating the circumstances under which stockholder-centric behavior is
the only rational strategy, and by providing avenues of attack for stock-
holders against boards who digress from the stockholder-centric model,
the law permits, and even encourages, directors to externalize the costs
of stockholder-centrism either by directly expropriating wealth from
other constituents to benefit stockholders, 101 or by imposing the costs of
enhancing stockholder profit on other constituent groups. 02 For exam-
96. For a discussion of the risk averseness of managers relative to stockholders, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 789, 808 (1984).
97. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 49 (cited in note 2).
98. See, for example, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Stone presents a broader model,
as does European company law. Corporate Social Responsibility (cited in note 5). See also note 26.
99. Compare Stanley, 19 Cambrian L. Rev. at 108 (cited in -note 3). Stanley states that
"[c]ompany law serves to legitimate and mask the relations involved in the mode of production.
Because of its inherent artificiality the concept of corporate personality presents a false represen-
tation of reality." Id.
100. I develop the argument contained in this paragraph in more depth in Mitchell, 70 Texas
L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2).
101. McDaniel describes this expropriation process in detail in Morey W. McDaniel, Bond-
holders and Stockholders, 1988 J. Corp. Law 205, 206-09. See also Morey W. McDaniel, Stock-
holders and Stakeholders, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 121 (1991).
102. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recog-
nizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1189 (1991) (discussing
the extent to which employees can be made to bear the cost of stockholder-centric behavior).
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pie, boards can undertake highly risky transactions that hold the (re-
mote) possibility of significant gains for stockholders but, as a
consequence, diminish the value of outstanding bonds by creating risks
for which their fixed interest rate does not compensate. 103 A board can
also agree to sell the corporation to a highly leveraged purchaser with
the knowledge that the purchaser will have to close plants and termi-
nate employees in order to service or retire its debt. 04 Although some
have argued that contracting processes suffice to protect these non-
stockholder constituents,10 5 others disagree. 06 Regardless of which side
of the debate one comes out on, however, it seems odd to build a legal
model of the corporation in such conflict with reality.
Why should corporate law be so different from corporate reality?
Why should directorial duties be owed only to putative "owners,"'10 7
and why should such "ownership" be without corresponding public
responsibility?
The answer lies in the way in which the corporation's conscience
can be asserted through the board of directors, combined with the neo-
classical assumption that individuals are self-interested utility maximiz-
ers. Put differently, centralized corporate management is a major rea-
son for the public corporation's efficacy, but according to traditional
corporate theory it will act in its own self-interest to the corporation's
detriment unless it is restrained. 08 As I have suggested, that restraint is
found in directors' duties to stockholders and in the mechanisms that
have developed to enforce those duties.
Those who support the stockholder-centric model argue that
103. The process of expropriation is well-described in Klein and Coffee at 235-37 (cited in
note 48).
104. O'Connor, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1191-92 (cited in note 102).
105. See, for example, William W. Bratton, The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Cor-
porate Debt Relationships, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 371, 383-407 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23, 26-43 (1991); Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds
Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 1.
106. See Johnson, 68 Texas L. Rev. at 891-98 (cited in note 81); David Millon, State Take-
over Laws: A Rebirth of Corporate Law?, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 903, 913-26 (1988); Mitchell, 70
Texas L. Rev. at 632-39 (cited in note 2); Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1170, 1199 (cited in note
4); O'Connor, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1194-95, 1212-17 (cited in note 102). For a nice introduction to
the parameters of the debate, see Marleen A. O'Connor, Introduction to Symposium, Corporate
Malaise -Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 1 (1991).
107. That some sort of ownership right is a necessary predicate to the identification of a
relationship as fiduciary has been long established. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del.
1988); Mitchell and Solomon, Corporate Finance at 395-402 (cited in note 59).
108. Agency cost theorists believe that management's self-interested conduct will redound to
the benefit of stockholders. Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 4
(cited in note 11).
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broadening the corporate legal model to include other constituents
would destroy the ability to impose such restraints.1 9 If directors were
permitted to justify their actions by reference to the interests of an-
other group, their ability to mask or justify self-dealing would be in-
creased dramatically. In fact, case law and commentary is replete with
assertions that directors would be put in an impossible position if they
had to decide among the claims of competing groups and, conversely,
that legal authorization to so decide would make management unac-
countable. 110 This, at least in part, is responsible for the doctrinal limi-
tations of preferred stockholders' preferences and creditors' rights to
those clearly and expressly articulated in their contract, as well as the
limited consideration given to the rights of employees."' Thus, the pos-
sibility of structuring corporate law to account for the real-world diver-
sity of corporate constituents is, typically, dismissed summarily.
Instead, directors are encouraged, through legal duty and self-protec-
tion, to demonstrate their allegiance to stockholder interests, which (as
has been observed) is most effectively accomplished by attention to the
bottom line. This behavior leads to an unremitting focus on the short
term.
Commentators who look to institutional investors and their new-
found power to improve corporate management overlook this important
cause of short-term focus in favoring proposals that strengthen the role
of institutional stockholders in corporate governance. 1 2 In fact, in-
creased institutional involvement is likely to exacerbate the problem of
short-termism. In the first place, institutional stockholders have fiduci-
ary obligations of varying degrees of stringency to maximize profits for
their beneficiaries." 3 All of the reasons that the stockholder-centric
109. See the discussion in Sommer, Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers v. In-
stitutions (cited in note 18).
110. See Mitchell, Constituencies Statutes, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 586-610 (cited in note 2);
Christopher Smart, Note, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our
Brother's Keeper?, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 301, 310-14 (1988); Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the
Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Corporation a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 Hastings L. J.
677, 696-97 (1988).
111. See, for example, Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(limited rights to preferred stockholders); Dalton v. American Investment Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del.
Ch. 1985) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (bondholders' rights limited to contract); Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch.
1986) (same).
112. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 529 (cited in note 22); Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 919-24
(cited in note 18); Barnard, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1135 (cited in note 18); Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at
1282-83 (cited in note 19); Conard, 22 U. Mich. L. J. at 167-68 (cited in note 24); Gilson and
Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (cited in note 18); Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
187 (cited in note 2) (at the time of quinquennial elections); Rock, 79 Geo. L. J. at 445 (cited in
note 21).
113. Under the Investment Advisors Act, the advisor is required to act solely for the benefit
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model in corporate law has led to short-termism are magnified in the
case of institutional fiduciaries, whose performance is more clearly mea-
surable (by portfolio value) than that of corporate management.
More important are the very real practical pressures on institutions
to insist on maximizing short-term corporate profit. Pension funds, the
largest class of institutional stockholders,114 have recently experienced
significant negative cash flow." 5 In both 1989 and 1990 the nation's
largest funds made benefit payments that exceeded contributions to
those funds by over $10 billion." 6 Further evidence exists that corpo-
rate pension funds have experienced negative cash flow for four consec-
utive years. 117  As contributions diminish, investment gains will
therefore become an increasingly important source of cash flow." 8 In
order to counter this negative cash flow, the logical institutional re-
sponse will be to demand higher current returns from equity invest-
ments. The current legal model of corporate governance provides
institutions with the power to make these demands felt by the board.
The importance of rejecting this stockholder-centric model thus grows
as institutions' need for current cash increases." 9
of her client, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988); Tamer Frankel, 2 The Regulation of Money
Managers at 347-48 (1978). According to the Investment Company Act, a money manager must
seek and obtain the best execution of a transaction for the investment company. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
1 to 80a-63 (1988); Frankel, The Regulation of Money Managers at 359-60. The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act requires that a plan fiduciary discharge her duties with respect to the
plan solely in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to them and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988). But see Foltz v. U.S. News and World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that ERISA creates no exclusive duty of the fiduciary to maximize pecuniary
benefits).
114. Brancato, Institutional Investors at Chart 1 (cited in note 22).
115. Peter Drucker predicted in 1976 that pension funds would experience negative cash flow
by 1990. Peter F. Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to
America at 75 (Harper and Row, 1976).
116. Sabine Schramm, Managers Endure Stagnant Year, Pensions & Investments 1, 1 (May
20, 1991) (with respect to the 200 largest defined benefit plans). A defined benefit plan provides a
definite formula for determining the amount of a participant's pension; the employer's contribu-
tion is actuarially determined each year based on factors such as the number of plan participants,
the age of plan participants, and the investment returns of plan assets. Joseph R. Simone and
Practicing Law Institute, Understanding ERISA: An Introduction to Basic Employee Retirement
Benefits at 14 (Practicing Law Institute, 1991).
117. Lori Miller, Cash Flow Problems Worsen for Corporates, Pensions & Investments 91, 91
(May 20, 1991).
118. Id.
119. The high turnover rate of institutional investors may also be evidence that institutions
are focused on the short term. Turnover data of New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks shows
that the turnover rate increased from 19% in 1955 to 55% in 1988. The Impact of Institutional
Investors on Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and the Capital Markets, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, No. 497,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 68 (1989). Similar findings were shown for the institutional holdings of
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Thus the law is structured in a manner that drives managers to
favor short-term stockholder wealth over long-term corporate welfare.
The practical problems faced by institutional investors create a strong
incentive for short-term management. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the problem can be ameliorated by bridging or reuniting
ownership and control.120 As I have argued, such reunification or bridg-
ing would have the opposite effect.
B. View From the Top: Directors' Views of Directors' Duties and
the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility
The limited vision created by narrow legal principles is more than
theoretical. It has had a significant real-world impact on directors' be-
havior. In his important book, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of
America's Corporate Boards, Jay Lorsch analyzes the results of an ex-
tensive survey of over 900 directors of the Standard & Poor's 400 com-
panies. 121  Starting from the premise that effective directors need
sufficient power to enable them to govern, 22 he evaluates whether that
power in fact exists. Although correctly observing that the legal power
to govern is only one type of such power, 123 he concludes that directors'
ambivalence over the focus of their duties and their accountability to
stockholders and other constituencies has led to an inability of corpo-
rate boards to reach a consensus on their most fundamental goals.,24
Lorsch contends that the majority of directors correctly believe
the top 50 corporations. Id. at 69. Turnover rates for the top investment advisors ranged from
400% to less than one percent. Id. at 33-34, 70-85.
Commentators disagree as to the significance of this data to the question of institutions' moti-
vation. Brancato states that the data does not mandate a conclusion that institutional investors as
a group take a short-term view, id. at 35, because turnover varies widely for equity portions of
portfolios and by type of institutional investor. Therefore, turnover cannot be directly related to
the holding period of any particular stock, and the measure of turnover does not include the more
highly volatile derivative securities. Id. at 34-35. Brancato's answer to the question of institutional
investor motivations varies with the profile of thi individual institutional investor. Id. at 42-43.
The Business Roundtable determined that the above-noted data indicate that an institutional in-
vestor's focus is short-term, id. at 95-96, especially in the case of pension funds. The Financial
Executives Research Foundation, however, believes that pension fund asset allocation does not
change significantly over the short term, that funds generally invest with a long-term view, and
that active fund management and high trading volume does not necessarily indicate a high turno-
ver rate. Id. at 198-99.
120. See, for example, Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 881 (cited in note 18); Gilson and Kraak-
man, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 876 (cited in note 18); Monks and Minow, Power and Accountability
(cited in note 18).
121. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates (cited in note 2). Lorsch discusses the methodology of his
survey in the book's Preface.
122. Id. at 12, 13.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 37-38, 39-45, 49, 70, 94, 176, 187.
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that their legal responsibility is to the stockholders. 12 5 Nonetheless,
most directors apparently believe that their moral and business duties
are owed to a much broader constituent group 12' with a long-term fo-
cus. 127 This belief conflicts both with directors' understanding of their
legal responsibilities 28 and the reality of the law.12 9 It also conflicts
with the realities produced by the limited legal mechanisms of deriva-
tive litigation, voting, and selling that I already have described.'30 The
justified and very real conflict between directors' beliefs about appro-
priate corporate governance and the narrow focus of the law leads, ac-
cording to Lorsch, to a board fragmented, and thus disempowered, by
confusion over its proper role.
Lorsch suggests that the directors' conflicts are heightened by the
presence of institutional investors as significant stockholders. As he
puts it, not only are institutions the least loyal of stockholders, but
"[directors] have difficulty taking the institutional owner seriously, be-
lieving its goals are at odds with the corporation's longer-term interests
and are too concerned with short-term gain."'31 Thus, rather than mak-
ing directors more concerned about the overall health of corporations,
the presence of institutional investors exacerbates the narrow short-
term focus already in place.'1
2
Among Lorsch's prescriptions is the clarification of directors' legal
duties in a manner permitting them to act in accordance with the real-
ity of American corporations. 13 3 Such a clarification and alteration
would be consistent with the historical judicial and legislative policy to-
wards boards, permitting them to act in the manner they see as most
advantageous to the corporation.13 4 Often legal policy and specific legal
125. Id. at 49.
126. Id. at 41, 43, 47. Empirical evidence that stockholders agree with this view is provided in
Larry D. Soderquist and Robert P. Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Re-
sponsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 Duke L. J. 819, 835-40.
127. Lorch, Pawns or Potentates at 38, 44-46. Dent claims that "[e]xperience confirms that
managers do not exercise discretion for the good of society." 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 893 (cited in note
18). Lorsch does not appear to claim that they do, but rather that they would like to. Moreover,
the reason they are not observed to consider social interests is obvious-they view it as inconsis-
tent with the legal obligations to the stockholders. Id. Dent states that managers manage in their
own interests, an assertion that contradicts his statement that most managers act in good faith. Id.
at 886.
128. Lorch, Pawns or Potentates at 11, 45.
129. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
130. See note 96 and accompanying text.
131. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 46-47.
132. Id. at 187.
133. Id. at 176-87.
134. Compare William H. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Per-
spectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1502 (1989) (noting the extent to which corporate
doctrine embodies practitioners' values which embrace corporate law as facilitating "the activities
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rules have been derived from the needs of corporate boards and busi-
ness realities. The practice should be discontinued, and directorial inde-
pendence restricted, only if there is an important countervailing policy
reason. The reason that has arisen most prominently in debates over
expanding directorial power is the need to prohibit self-dealing or, per-
haps more broadly, to ensure that directors act in the corporation's
interest.
C. The Myth of Self-Dealing
An enormous amount of scholarly, judicial, and legislative energy
has been aimed at preventing corporate management from engaging in
self-dealing, or at providing corporate and stockholder remedies when
such self-dealing actually occurs. 35 The basis for this concern is, as I
earlier suggested, the neoclassical assumption that individuals are self-
interested wealth maximizers who, left to their own devices, will pursue
their own goals. The aggregate effect of this competitive behavior, ac-
cording to economic theory, will be to enhance social welfare through
the creation and efficient allocation of wealth. This would not be true
with respect to the internal workings of the corporation, because stock-
holders never would invest their money if managers were permitted to
appropriate it to their own benefit. Thus, at least implicitly, the law
acknowledges the collective aspect of the corporate individual by delegi-
timizing the usually applauded neoclassical behavior of one group of
actors-the directors-by decreeing that it should act in the interests of
another group-the stockholders."3 6 Thus, directors and stockholders
are united in pursuit of a common goal, and the corporate individual
can take its place alongside other individuals in the competitive capital-
ist environment in pursuit of its own self-interest. In order for this
model to succeed, and for the substantial advantages of the corporate
form to be realized, the internal law of corporations must work to con-
trol management's natural tendency to act in its own interests. Thus,
the restraint of managerial self-dealing long has been the central focus
of corporate law.
Over time, the strength with which the law has interdicted self-
of others in a regulated context").
135. By "self-dealing" I mean board and management behavior that does not result in stock-
holder wealth-maximization, as defined in note 95 and accompanying text. Although my specific
focus in this subsection is on directors' transactions with the corporation, all self-dealing behavior
is evaluated under the fairness test, discussed in note 147, that underlies the following analysis.
Behavior governed by the business judgment rule is, by definition, not self-dealing.
136. In contrast, agency cost theorists argue that, within a proper structural context, mana-
gerial pursuit of its own self-interest will result in stockholder well-being. Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at
292-305 (cited in note 4).
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dealing has eroded, perhaps because of a pragmatic realization that the
human drive towards self-interest is too strong to be restrained by legal
rules, or perhaps because of the belief that not all self-interested behav-
ior is bad behavior. 137 This change has been accompanied by a shift in
the emphasis of directors' fiduciary obligations from a command to pur-
sue the best interests of stockholders to a direction to provide fairly for
the stockholders.13 8 But the central focus of corporate law has, despite
this evolution, continued to be the problem of self-dealing.
This "obsession" with self-dealing, as Lipton and Rosenblum put
it, 139 is entirely unjustified, not only because it is reasonable to assume
that most directors actually operate in a good faith desire to benefit the
corporation they serve,'40 but also because the law has legitimated some
kinds of self-dealing for at least sixty years.' Because this concern
with self-dealing also may encourage directors to focus on actions that
demonstrably benefit stockholders which, as I have suggested, has the
effect of focusing directors on the short term, it is not only unjustified
but also potentially harmful.
Self-dealing is an accepted norm of corporate law.'42 Twenty-five
years have passed since Harold Marsh first outlined the evolution of
137. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (stating that "[t]he fact that some
interested transactions are permitted under our corporate law demonstrates that they are not in-
herently detrimental to a corporation").
138. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971) (holding that the intrinsic
fairness test applies to self-dealing transactions); TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374
A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977) (same); ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.02 at 277-79 (cited
in note 1) (stating that "[t]he great weight of authority today permits a director or senior executive
to enter into transactions with his corporation so long as he has acted fairly in his dealings with
the corporation"); David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread
in Corporate Doctrine, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 184, 188 (1979) (asserting that fairness is the "dominant
doctrine" governing interested transactions); William M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Pri-
vate Corporations at 918 (Callaghan, 1931).
139. Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 195 (cited in note 2).
140. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 30-31 (cited in note 2). See also The Conference Board
at 9 (cited in note 41) (suggesting that the overwhelming majority of boards consist of directors
with little opportunity for conflicts of interest). The assumption is, it seems to me, perfectly justi-
fied by the continued existence of the public corporation. If bad faith conduct were the norm, our
corporate system could not survive no matter what the legal rules were.
141. See notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
142. Brudney, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 607-08 (cited in note 2) (stating that "[tihe latest learning
contemplates that there are values to be served by permitting management to self-deal, but sub-
jects all such transactions to the formal requirement that they be disclosed to and approved by
directors who are not interested in the transaction"); Nader, Green, and Seligman, Taming the
Giant Corporation at 114 (cited in note 26).
The Delaware definition of self-dealing seems to include any transaction between a manager
and the corporation. In Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-23 (Del. 1971), the
court defined "self-dealing" as occurring when the fiduciary (in that case a parent corporation)
received a benefit at the expense of the beneficiary (in that case a subsidiary). The consequence of
a finding of self-dealing is that the fairness test will be applied. Id. Since any transaction will
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fiduciary rules prohibiting self-dealing from strict prophylactic mea-
sures applicable in cases where conflict of interest existed to rules per-
mitting self-dealing upon the approval of disinterested directors,
stockholders, or a court which determined that the transaction in ques-
tion was fair. 4 ' The evolution is significant for several reasons. First,
the old rules prohibited transactions in which the potential for self-
dealing existed, whether or not self-dealing actually occurred. 44 This is
consistent with the design of prophylactic rules which typically apply in
the law to situations that present a strong possibility of harm, but in
which the actual existence of harm is difficult to determine. 145 The new
rules actually permit self-dealing itself, and not simply transactions
that may give rise to it. Therefore, upon fulfillment of a relatively low
involve different forms of consideration on each side, self-dealing, as defined by the court, appar-
ently always will exist in transactions between a manager and the corporation. See, for example,
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594-96 (Del. Ch. 1986) (applying the intrinsic
fairness test when the controlling stockholder allocated different forms of merger consideration to
himself and non-controlling stockholders). Contrast Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp.,
374 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. Ch. 1977) (holding that the intrinsic fairness test applied when a parent
deprived its subsidiary of the power to bargain over contracts with third parties); Summa Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406-07 (Del. 1988) (stating that "[iut is well established
. . . that one who stands on both sides of a transaction has the burden of proving entire
fairness. . . . In the absence of arm's-length bargaining . . . this obligation inheres in, and invari-
ably arises from the parent-subsidiary relationship."). But compare In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d
509, 518 (3rd Cir. 1983) (suggesting that whether an arrangement constitutes self-dealing depends
on the proportionality of burdens and benefits).
Of course the self-dealing nature of such a transaction can be cured by the use of an indepen-
dent bargaining agent, such as a board with independent directors or an independent board com-
mittee. See, for example, Del. Code Ann. § 144 (1983); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney,
1986); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 8.62 (1985). The importance of independent directors in sani-
tizing conflict of interest transactions was highlighted during the takeover wars of the 1980s.
Mitchell and Solomon, Corporate Finance at 791 (cited in note 59). In the absence of such an
independent bargaining agent, the only question that remains, and the one which is designed to
distinguish acceptable self-dealing from that which is unacceptable, is whether the transaction was
fair.
143. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. Law. 35 (1966). The statutory formulation permitting self-dealing upon compliance with
specified procedural prerequisites (including, in some cases, the substantive prerequisite of "fair-
ness") is exemplified by Del. Code Ann. § 144 (1983); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.61, 8.62
(1985); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney 1986); Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 18,
702 P.2d 212, 220-21 (Cal. 1985); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d
405, 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. 1952); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 68-70 (D.N.J. 1974);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-24 (Del. 1976); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714
(Del. 1983); Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908, 920-22 (E.D. La. 1984) (applying
Louisiana law).
144. Marsh, 22 Bus. Law. at 36-39.
145. For classic applications, see Globe Wooden Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y.
483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918); Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759 (1972). See also Edward
Brodsky and M. Patricia Adamski, Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: Rights, Duties and
Liabilities § 3.01 (Callaghan, Supp. 1991) (asserting that the strict rule removes all temptation for
directors to deal with their corporation, thus protecting the corporation from the danger that the
director would secure an undue advantage for himself at the corporation's expense).
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threshold of disinterested approval 146 or fairness,147 directors can deal
adversely with their corporations.
Moreover, the "fairness" standard significantly dilutes the implied
standard under the old formulation, which treated self-dealing as inher-
ently bad. This observation leads to another significant aspect of the
evolution: When self-interested behavior by directors was not abso-
lutely proscribed, it became, at least at some level, morally acceptable.
Although the new rules continue to prohibit the most egregious self-
dealing, that which is demonstrably unfair to the corporation or the
stockholders, 148 the obligation of directors to act in the best interests of
the corporation and its stockholders is replaced with a much lower duty
of fairness.
This validation of self-dealing has been accomplished through the
statutory law of most jurisdictions. 149 The ALI has enshrined it in its
146. The determination of whether a director is disinterested tends to be quite formal and
objective and disregards subjective considerations or problems of structural bias. See, for example,
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61(d) (1985). Conse-
quently, the requirement of disinterested director approval is not terribly strenuous.
147. "Fairness" is a relatively low level of fiduciary conduct. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton
Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 54 (5th Cir. 1980); Note, Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under
Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1874, 1876 (1978) (stating
that fairness is a low-level test); Fletcher, Cyclopedia at 915 (cited in note 138) (indicating that the
consensus of commentators believe that the fairness standard is not effective). Contrast Ahmed
Bulbilia and Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Wa-
tering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 201, 223-26 (1977) (noting the weak-
nesses of the fairness test); ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.02(a)(2)(B) at 277, 320-22,
Reporter's Notes 6, 7 (cited in note 1); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793,
805 (Ill. 1960) (stating that it is useless to analogize or distinguish circumstances of this case to
those cited by the parties in light of the infinite factual variations affecting fairness of disputed
transactions in each case). In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983), the Delaware
Supreme Court defined fairness in terms of fair dealing and fair price, the former requiring full
disclosure, and considerations of timing, initiation, structure and the like, and the latter requiring
"all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future property, and any other [relevant] ele-
ments." Although anticipated as a strong duty, see, for example, id. at 709 n.7 (suggesting that
replicating an arms'-length bargain, with each party exerting full bargaining power, through the
use of an independent directors' committee, creates strong evidence of fairness), in application it is
not terribly strenuous, compounded by difficult problems of valuation, and certainly much weaker
than a prophylactic or other standard requiring absolute fiduciary loyalty. Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (suggesting that fairness has two aspects: (i) fair deal-
ing, which involves the initiation, structuring, negotiation, and candor regarding a transaction; and
(ii) fair price, which mandates a director be committed to obtaining the highest price reasonably
available to the shareholders in an action for corporate control).
148. Fiduciary rules often are stated in terms of the corporation's interest. See note 79. The
statement in the text is not meant to contradict my earlier observations regarding the equation of
the stockholders' and corporation's interests.
149. Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.61 (1985). The ALI reports "safe harbor" statutes
for directors' transactions with the corporation to have been adopted in 38 states. ALI Principles
of Corporate Governance § 5.02 at 312-13, Reporter's Note 1 (cited in note 1). See also Ernest L.
Folk, Rodman Ward, Jr., and Edward P. Welch, Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law §
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Principles of Corporate Governance,'5 0 and has moved it even further
by applying similar standards not only in the traditional area of direc-
tors' transactions with the corporation, but also to the personal use by
directors of corporate assets, directors' competition with the corpora-
tion, and the doctrine of corporate opportunities.15 ' In each of these
cases, disclosure by the self-dealing director, as well as disinterested ap-
proval, fairness, or both,15 2 validates the act of self-dealing.
My present purpose is not to take issue with this validation of self-
dealing.' 5 ' My point, and one that is critical to meaningful corporate
governance reform, is that the time has come to be realistic about self-
dealing. We have accepted it as a part of corporate life. An ardently-
voiced objection to loosening directors' constraints on the ground that it
will open up a multitude of horizons for self-interested behavior ap-
pears at this stage in our development to be hypocrisy. If we permit
directors to engage in self-dealing upon the approval of their colleagues,
it seems silly to be concerned with giving them more flexibility to man-
age the corporation.
Nor do the positional conflicts of directors, identified as such by
144.1 (Little, Brown, 1988) (stating that "[a]lmost all jurisdictions now have interested director
statutes that are very similar to and in some cases identical to section 144").
150. ALI Principles of Corporate Governance Part V at 263-515 (cited in note 1). The ALI
in this Part subtly acknowledges the change in fiduciary standard by calling what once was the
duty of loyalty the "duty of fair dealing." Although the ALI explains this change as made to dis-
tinguish cases of fiduciary self-dealing from those involving other conflicts of interest, id. at 1,
Introductory Note, it nevertheless accurately reflects a shift in the standard from loyalty to
fairness.
The ALI offers a somewhat watered down statutory formulation permitting self-dealing, in-
cluding disinterested director approval (or shareholder approval) and the possibility of a reasona-
ble belief that the transaction was fair (or did not constitute waste). Id. § 5.02 at 312-13. A
stronger result may be obtained by those cases interpreting typical statutes, such as New Jersey's
or California's, as inclusive of fairness. See, for example, Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp.
44, 65-68 (D.N.J. 1974); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dardini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66, 75 (1952). On the other hand, failure to disclose is fatal under the ALI Principles, regard-
less of fairness. ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.02 (cited in note 1). See also, for
example, State ex. rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d. 375, 391 P.2d 979,
983-87 (1964); Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759, 768 (1972).
151. Id. In fairness, this extension is quite consistent with the common-law principles that
otherwise govern in these areas. Ellzey v. Fry-Puff, Inc., 376 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1979) (re-
mand for factual determination whether the director can justify his action by showing full disclo-
sure of material facts and transaction ratified, or inherent fairness); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn.
207, 222 N.W.2d 71, 82 (1974) (even though court found that the directors did not usurp corporate
opportunity, court would find transaction sanitized because the directors fully disclosed material
facts to the board and the directors acted with the board's acquiescence, if not with its approval).
152. Scott, 386 F. Supp. at 44; Remillard Brick Co., 241 P.2d at 66.
153. But see Mitchell, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1680-81 (cited in note 20) (criticizing the dilution
of fiduciary standards in the context of close corporations). I also examine and strongly criticize
the fairness standard in a forthcoming article.
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Melvin Eisenberg 54  and highlighted by the tender offer decade,'
155
change much with respect to this observation. While Eisenberg ar-
gues-correctly, I believe-that "core structural rules" and "core fiduci-
ary rules" addressing positional conflicts should be mandatory,'56 the
rules that have developed provide directors with a great deal of latitude
in resolving these positional conflicts in their favor. 5 For example, the
old-but still current-learning on proxy contest reimbursement gives
incumbent management the ability to protect its position by using cor-
porate funds and processes.'58 While at the extreme this ability is
checked, 59 enormous latitude remains. 60 In the more recent area of
takeover defense law, although some jurisdictions view defensive tactics
more strictly, the law of Delaware insulates the incumbents from
changes in control. That insulation is enhanced in those states that
have adopted some form of antitakeover statute.' 6' In the general area
of voting rights, recent case law has eased the conditions under which
154. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1471-72
(1989) (defining "positional conflicts" of interest, in contrast to "traditional conflicts of interest,"
as resulting from managers' interests "in maintaining and enhancing their positions even at the
shareholders' expense").
155. The essential, and obvious, problem arising from unwanted tender offers is that direc-
tors might act to protect their own status rather than the interests of the corporation or its stock-
holders. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting the
"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those
of the corporation and its shareholders").
156. Eisenberg, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 1480-81 (cited in note 50).
157. See, for example, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142-
55 (Del. 1989); Salant Acquisition Corp. v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 199, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1406-07 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Henry N. Butler,
Corporate-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L.
Rev. 365, 369-76; Mitchell and Solomon, Corporate Finance at 892-95 (cited in note 59) (listing
and identifying by type state antitakeover statutes empowering corporate boards to resist un-
wanted takeovers).
158. See, for example, Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 340-45 (Del. 1983);
Street v. Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691, 693-94 (Mo. 1966); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 291-92 (1955); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp.
604, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying Delaware law); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 171 A. 226, 227-30 (Del. Ch. 1934); Lewis Loss and Joel Seligman, Securities Regulations at
860 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1961).
159. Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654-55 (Del. Ch. 1988) (prohibiting
a board from precluding an unwanted takeover by increasing the board size and filling vacancies in
the form of a hostile consent solicitation); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885-87 (6th
Cir. 1986) (requiring that corporate advantages be made available to challengers as a condition to
management's use).
160. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., 579 A.2d 1115, 1119-23 (Del. Ch. 1990) (permitting a
board to reschedule an annual meeting in the face of a hostile takeover/proxy contest after the
record date already had been set); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 438-39
(Del. 1971); Aprahamiam v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205-08 (Del. 1987).
161. The most famous of these statutes is the Pennsylvania act. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§§ 1721, 2551, 2561, 2571, 2581 (Purdon 1990). See generally Robert H. Winter, et al., State Take-
over Statutes and Poison Pills (Supp. 1990).
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directors can affect the timing of important stockholder votes, including
votes regarding the election of directors. 162 Finally, in the derivative
suit area, case law firmly puts the progress of most derivative actions in
the hands of the board.
163
The fact that incumbent directors have firm control over their cor-
porations' proxy machinery-subject to a relatively low threshold re-
quirement of truthful disclosure-reinforces this reality, 6" as does the
increasing ability of directors to prevent courtroom challenges to their
actions by dismissing derivative suits.6 5 Thus, even with respect to po-
sitional conflicts, the law has consistently demonstrated less than ar-
dent concern over the possibility of directorial entrenchment. In fact,
the law seems to encourage it. With respect to this central issue of those
who oppose greater directorial discretion, the battle already has been
lost.
D. Conclusion
The problem of short-term corporate focus that has been at the
center of recent debate on corporate governance reform has been
caused directly by the artificial bilateral structure of the corporation
that attempts to organize the collectivity around the traditional con-
cerns of law designed to regulate transactions and relationships between
individuals. In terms of the current discourse, the central failing of
American corporations has been caused by the stockholder-centric
structure. When the problem is seen in this light, the law-and-econom-
ics nexus-of-contracts and agency-cost approaches can be dismissed on
the mere observation that they replicate, as a normative matter, this
bilateral, stockholder-centric structure.
Our inability to create a more realistic legal model of the corpora-
tion has been caused by the fear that liberating the directors from the
shackles of the traditional model will cause them to act solely in their
162. See Stahl, 579 A.2d at 1121-22.
163. Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Derivative Actions: Law and Practice § 5.03 (Wil-
mette, Supp. 1991) (discussing a variety of judicial approaches to boards' control over derivative
litigation).
164. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (1990) (suggesting that because of wide
dispersal of shareholdings, management's only real threat from stockholder voting is in the case of
a proxy contest); Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 903 (cited in note 18) (stating that management
controls proxy voting). Contrast Eisenberg, Structure of the Corporation at 99 (cited in note 2)
(asserting that the law does not give management "virtually exclusive access" to proxy machinery).
165. Compare Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 183-89 (Del. 1988) (narrowly defining the cir-
cumstances under which a demand on the board in a derivative suit will be excused), with Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1711 (1991) (holding that the determination of
whether a demand on a board required as a precondition to a stockholder derivative suit is a
matter of state law).
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own self-interest and to the detriment of the corporation. Thus, enor-
mous energy has been expended on shoring up the traditional model by
a series of fiduciary rules, now weakened to virtual inefficacy. Once we
recognize that the substantial dilution of those rules has not in fact led
to wholesale directorial theft, but rather has acculturated "fair" self-
dealing, we can reconceptualize the basic model on more sensible and
realistic terms.
IV. THE CORPORATION RECONSTRUCTED: THE BOARD AS MEDIATOR
I have demonstrated thus far the extent to which traditional and
economics-based corporate theory ground the public corporation firmly
in the traditional model of bilateral relationships based upon correla-
tive rights and duties as well as neoclassical economics' assumptions
about human behavior. I have argued that the assumptions upon which
this structure was built, as well as those upon which it today is justified,
result in the denial of the possibility of cooperative coexistence within a
collective structure and the artificial exclusion from corporate law con-
cern of a variety of constituent groups upon which the corporation de-
pends for its survival and success. Moreover, I have suggested that the
artificiality of corporate structure requires directors to repress their
best business instincts by requiring an exclusive focus on stockholder
concerns and, as a practical correlative, on short-term performance.
What I have not yet done, and now will do, is use these observations to
reconstruct the corporation into a collectivity that can overcome the
problems of directorial dormancy, short-term focus, and, ultimately, so-
cial irresponsibility.
My starting point is the newly-charged board I described in Part I,
a board whose members and duties are distinct from, and independent
of, those of management, and which is responsible for those aspects of
corporate governance most easily accomplished by a part-time body and
most in need of protection from conflicting interests: the capital struc-
ture of the corporation and the distribution and allocation of corporate
assets and costs, including the hiring and compensation of executive
employees. In suggesting this focus of the board, I argued that the law's
concern with managerial self-dealing could be diminished significantly
by removing from operating management's control those decisions that
present the greatest conflicts of interest. I acknowledged, however, that
this did little to remove the possibility of positional conflicts of interest,
in which the board of directors might be tempted to make structural or
distributional decisions in a manner that best protected its own incum-
bency, and which are a significant factor in perpetuating short-term fo-
cus. Therefore, before moving on to the broadened focus of the board, I
will deal with the problem of positional conflicts.
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Positional conflicts arise because the stockholders have the power
to replace the board, either through the electoral process or by sale of
the corporation's stock to a single owner who can then use the electoral
process to replace the board. 166 My proposal is simple, though radical,
and is designed not only to remove the possibility of positional conflicts
but also to establish the conditions necessary to permit the board to
take a broader, long-term view of the corporation's interests. My propo-
sal, in sum, is to eliminate the electoral process altogether.
Under my proposal, stockholders would no longer have the right to
vote. This proposal, although radical, is not new, having been suggested
(hypothetically) by Bayless Manning in 1958, in a model in which
shares of stock would be much like voting trust certificates, with the
board self-perpetuating much like voting trustees. 16 7 Thus, the proposal
eliminates the possibility of positional conflicts by eliminating the con-
dition-stockholder voting-that makes them possible.
Before further analyzing this proposal and arguing that it is an im-
portant component of ensuring corporate management in the long-term,
a few-preliminary details must be discussed. If stockholders are not to
elect directors, one might wonder how the directors are to be selected.
The solution is reasonably simple: the board selects the board. Public
corporations rarely begin as such. Rather, they more typically begin life
as close corporations and are brought public at some point in their exis-
tence to fulfill the need for additional capital, liquidity of stock, or for a
variety of other reasons. 6 " Obviously, when the corporation is brought
public, it already has a board of directors. Even a corporation that be-
gins operations as a public corporation must be formed with an incum-
bent board of directors prior to the commencement of a public offering.
Thus the board is, in a real sense, a priori the public corporation.
The boards of most close corporations going public, however, are
likely to consist of managers and stockholders. 169 As I suggested in Part
166. Eisenberg, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1472 (cited in note 50).
167. Manning, 67 Yale L. J. at 1490 (cited in note 18). The fact that boards are already
largely self-perpetuating as a de facto matter is supported by the Conference Board report, which
shows the median term of directors' service to be nine years. Conference Board at 21 (cited in note
41). Terms of service might be longer but for the combination of the relatively advanced ages of
directors and the fact that 629 of the responding companies have mandatory retirement policies.
See id. (listing median ages and percentage of corporations having mandatory retirement policies).
The report also identifies a "dramatic movement" away from one-year board terms to staggered
three-year terms. Id. at 16-17. The ages, gender, and race of board members support the conclusion
that boards also self-replicate in selecting new directors. Id. at vii, 3-4, 16-17.
168. The advantages of "going public" are summarized in Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M.
Manko, and Robert S. Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 Vill. L.
Rev. 1, 3-4 (1981).
169. This is inherent in the generally accepted definitions of close corporations. See, for ex-
ample, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (giving defini-
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II, for the newly-revitalized board to work effectively, it should consist
of no managers or stockholders at all. Therefore, prior to going public,
the board would have to replace itself with a group of directors who are
neither managers nor stockholders, thus severing the board from man-
agement and ensuring that the directors lack financial conflicts of inter-
est as stockholders. 17 Because the board would be in a position to
replace itself, it would be far less likely to feel allegiance to manage-
ment, and its independence of management would then be complete.
And the board, once in place, would perpetuate itself by means of the
currently-extant expedient of permitting boards to fill vacancies that
arise.
171
Although I have attempted to eliminate the circumstances that
typically give rise to self-interested directorial actions, no guarantee ex-
ists that such actions will not occur occasionally. While the broadened
duties I will later suggest-together with the derivative suit mechanism
and the traditional board duties of loyalty and care-are designed to
provide some discipline for directors, circumstances may present them-
selves that require the removal of directors. Since elections for directors
will no longer be held, a method must be provided to permit the re-
moval of directors whose misfeasance or nonfeasance is detrimental to
the corporation. Such a method already exists in statutory provisions
providing for removal of directors for cause.'72 That power typically is
provided to stockholders, as the corporate constituent group empow-
ered to elect directors.17 But this power can be broadened to include all
of those constituent groups that are included within the new corporate
structure. And while the power typically is exercised at meetings, it
seems at least as efficacious, if not more so, to provide for the exercise
of this power through judicial processes, perhaps as part of the ex-
panded litigation mechanism I will next describe. Thus, directors who
fail to exercise their responsibilities, or who act against the interests of
the corporation in a manner constituting cause (a term that has been
given meaning in the case law but can be statutorily enacted1 74 ), can be
tions of close corporations).
170. Alternatively, but less likely, the directors could give up their managerial positions and
remain on the board. In order to remain as directors, however, they will have to relinquish all of
their stock, see note 64 and accompanying text, which further supports the likelihood that they
will retain their management positions rather than their board positions.
171. See, for example, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.10 (1985); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 705
(McKinney 1986).
172. See, for example, Del. Code Ann. § 141(k) (1983); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.08
(1985); Calif. Corp. Code § 303 (West 1990).
173. See note 172.
174. For cases discussing the meaning of "cause" for director removal, see Campbell v.
Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 860-61 (Del. Ch. 1957); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F.Supp
532, 580-81 (D. Del. 1975); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 691, 469 P.2d 583, 585-
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removed by a court in an action brought on behalf of the corporation by
any member of a constituent group. 175 Perhaps such directors could also
be removed for cause by the other directors, as some corporations stat-
utes now provide, 176 with an appeal by the subject director to the ap-
propriate court.
Some might object to the potential increase in costs and litigation
that this proposal could create. These consequences are unlikely to oc-
cur. Director removal is in fact rarely litigated. 77 Given the docu-
mented proclivity of stockholders to reelect incumbents, 7 8 this hardly
seems due to the fact that stockholders instead target certain directors
to defeat for reelection. 79 Nor has the takeover market been described
as working to remove individual directors who are not doing their jobs
or who are engaging in self-dealing, except in the very broadest sense of
replacing an entire management that persistently fails to maximize
stockholder return, 80 a premise I already have rejected. Finally, such
litigation as does occur will have to be frequent and costly even to ap-
proach the expense of annual meetings and proxy solicitations.' 8 ' Thus,
it seems, at least as a preliminary matter, that the director removal
86 (1970); Ross v. 311 North Central Avenue Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. App.2d 336, 264 N.E.2d 406, 412-
13 (App. Ct. Ill. 1970); Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Bossier v. Con-
nell, No. 8624, slip op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1986).
175. Strike suits or malicious litigation could be avoided by limiting standing to a certain
threshold interest in the corporation, or the posting of a bond as is commonly the practice in
derivative actions, see DeMott, Derivative Actions §§ 3.01-3.04 (cited in note 163), and through
analogies to the contemporaneous ownership rule, id. § 4.03.
176. See Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.08, Statutory Comparison l 5. (1985); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 156B § 51(c) (Law Co-op. 1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.233(2)(c) (West 1985);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.317 (Vernon 1991); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-41(2)(c) (1985); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 14A: 6-6(3) (West 1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.58 (Page Supp. 1990); Tenn. Code Ann. §
48-18-108(d) (1988).
177. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795, 806-07 (1983) (suggesting that the
removal process, either with or without cause, is cumbersome and inappropriate, and thus is rarely
used in a publicly held corporation).
178. The Conference Board report supports this observation. Conference Board at 21 (cited
in note 41).
179. This is particularly evident in light of the common practice of nominating slates of di-
rectors. Robert S. Klein, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders'
Franchise Right, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 129, 131-32 (1991).
180. This is described by Professor Booth as the misinvestment hypothesis. Booth, 79 Cal. L.
Rev. at 1056 (cited in note 17). See also Kraakman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 892, 897-98 (cited in note
17).
181. Constance B. Doris, Proxy Contests and Corporate Control at A-6, A-7 (BNA, 1990). In
a 1984 battle between Carter Hawley Hale and The Limited, Inc., Carter spent $1.25 million and
The Limited spent $1.1 million; in 1982, Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp. was challenged, and
the insurgents spent $1.5 to 2.15 million, and Gulf management spent more than $2.15 million; in
1982, when Pabst Brewing Co. was challenged, insurgents spent approximately $7.5 million. Id.
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problem can be handled without systemic damage and perhaps in a
manner that diminishes its current costs.
182
One final concern this self-perpetuation mechanism poses, and it is
one that is properly raised in light of the board's broadened focus, is
that the remarkable homogeneity of boards is likely to continue. For
example, ninety-four percent of the directors of the Fortune 1000 cor-
porations are white men, two-thirds of whom are over the age of fifty-
five.183 It seems unlikely that such boards would have the breadth of
vision or experience to realize the potential of the board's broadened
legal responsibilities. One possible solution might be to mandate that
certain percentages of each board be selected from among certain
groups, such as stockholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and the
community.' Although similar proposals have been made before, they
have been made in the context of interest group representation.'85 My
proposal contemplates that all directors share the same duties, and any
tendency towards interest group identification could be lessened by a
requirement that the individuals selected for each category have the
relevant relationship with corporations other than the one on whose
board they serve. For example, the employee directors would be em-
ployees of other corporations, as would the stockholder directors, credi-
tor directors, customer directors, and supplier directors. Certainly other
ways of discouraging interest group directorships might be constructed.
A final detail concerns timing. I have suggested that boards would
become independent and self-perpetuating at the time that corpora-
tions went public, but implied that the public offering would be with
respect to voting stock. If so, my proposal might result in the continued
close ownership of corporate stock, with financing achieved by public
issuance of nonvoting preferred stock or debt, in order to permit the
close corporation board to retain control and, with it, the opportunity
to take advantage of other constituents. Although the cost of these
methods of obtaining external financing might be prohibitive,' it is
182. It might be preferable to set up arbitral tribunals solely to adjudicate director removal
actions, a detail that could be dealt with at such time as my proposals were adopted.
183. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 18 (cited in note 2).
184. These are the constituents typically enumerated in state corporate constituency stat-
utes. See Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2). Although this may be neither a
sufficiently broad nor sufficiently narrow group of constituents, the definitive identification of the
appropriate constituent groups is beyond the scope of this Article. Consideration might be given,
for example, to having an executive of another corporation sit on the board to bring a management
perspective to the board. On the other hand, creditor, supplier, and customer directors might well
be corporate managers themselves, so this perspective would already be present.
185. See, for example, Nader, Green, and Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation at 123-26
(cited in note 26) (discussing such proposals).
186. Although equity financing is considered to be more expensive than debt, see J. Fred
Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance at 678-80 (Dryden, 8th ed.
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foreseeable that such a shift could happen. More to the point, however,
my position is that once corporations enter the public financing market
at all, the possibility that stockholder-centrism could result in short-
term focus and externalized costs clearly exists. In fact, in the case of a
corporation with closely owned common stock, the conflict between
stockholder welfare and the rights of others is more personal and thus
other public financing methods might exacerbate the problem of stock-
holder-centrism and short-term focus. 18 7 In some sense, the increase in
short-termism caused by institutional ownership presents an analogous
problem, as the concentration of institutional ownership begins, at some
level, to resemble the ownership structure of close corporations. 18 8 Con-
sequently, my proposal is to have the board become self-perpetuating at
any time that the corporation enters the public market for external fi-
nancing. Developed concepts of "public offerings" under the Securities
Act of 1933 could be adapted to provide a clear test for when this would
occur.1
8 9
Transitional rules would have to be developed in order to alter the
governance structures of existing public corporations. A relatively easy
method of accomplishing this result would be to require each current
management director to choose, within some established period of time,
whether to remain as a manager or director and to tender the appropri-
ate resignation. 9 ' The remaining directors would then have an interval
in which they could fill the newly created vacancies.
Some might object that my proposal eliminates the market for cor-
porate control and thus precludes the transfer of assets to their highest
valued use that is necessary for a healthy economy. Such an objection
would be unwarranted. In the first place, boards of directors would con-
1987), debt has the disadvantage of regular required interest payments.
187. Larry D. Soderquist, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility:
Close and Small Public Corporations, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1410-13 (1980).
The need for protecting the owners of privately placed securities is lessened because of the
meaningful negotiating opportunities available to such purchasers. See Mitchell, 65 N.Y. L. Rev. at
1177-86 (cited in note 4). Compare McDaniel, 41 Bus. Law. at 413 (cited in note 60) (describing
the weak position of public debtholders).
188. Rock also notes this fact in terms of the similarity in collective action problems. Rock,
79 Geo. L. J. at 459 n.44 (cited in note 21). I don't want to exaggerate this point. It is unlikely that
one or two institutions will dominate the public corporation in the same way that controlling
stockholders dominate the paradigmatic close corporation. See Roe, 27 J. Fin. Econ. at 9-21 (cited
in note 24) (describing the barriers to significant concentrations of capital in individual
institutions).
189. See, for example, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 119-25 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 897-900 (5th Cir. 1977); Sec. Act Rel.
No. 6389 (1982) (announcing the adoption of Regulation D by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission); Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation at 317-80 (cited in note 158).




tinue to be empowered, in the context of their structuring and distribu-
tional responsibilities, to sell all or a portion of the corporation's
assets'9 ' or engage in a corporate combination.192 Ensuring that such
transactions are undertaken by the corporation rather than by the
stockholders'9 3 puts the board in a position to control their timing and
circumstances, thus diminishing the likelihood that stockholders can
gratify their short-term desires. It also permits the board to allocate the
consideration in a manner consistent with the duty of fairness I will
describe19 4 rather than permitting stockholders to capture all of the
gains, frequently at the expense of other constituents. 195
Moreover, nothing in my proposal prevents the corporation from
being sold through the sale of its stock. In order to ensure the distribu-
tional fairness that is at the heart of my proposal, however, a purchaser
would be required to buy all outstanding public debt as well as public
stock. This would preclude the possibility of leveraged transactions that
result in high premiums to stockholders while damaging the value of
existing public debt or preferred stock, as I shall later illustrate. 96 In
addition, although I leave elaboration of this point to another article,
continuing to subject the newly private company to constituency re-
sponsibilities, at a minimum consistent with moderate interpretations
of constituency legislation, would seem appropriate for the protection of
employees and other constituents. As a result, a purchaser would be
unable to recapture any of the purchase price by taking advantage of
other corporate constituents.
97
I acknowledged earlier that this proposal is radical, but that over-
states reality. The proposal is radical only if you assume that it will free
the board to engage in self-interested behavior and, more to the point,
if you insist that the board's power must be legitimated by principles of
democratic accountability. As to the first point, my proposal removes
any opportunity for directors to gratify self-interest. If they are neither
191. See, for example, Del. Code Ann. § 271 (1983).
192. See, for example, id. § 251. Adopting my proposal would resolve effectively the issue of
the legality of sales of control for a premium by strongly discouraging the sale of less than all of a
corporation's stock. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1955); William D.
Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
505, 506-15 (1965); George B. Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A
Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420, 420-28 (1965).
193. For an example of a transaction undertaken by the controlling stockholder that the
court believed should have been a corporate transaction, see Perlman, 219 F.2d at 173.
194. See notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
195. Expropriation is discussed at notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
196. See note 223 and accompanying text.
197. Contrast Wallman, 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 163-65 (cited in note 5) (offering a modest
interpretation of constituency statutes requiring that corporate decisions be made in the best in-
terests of the corporation as a whole).
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stockholders nor employees of the corporation, they have no financial
interest in the corporation that could be gratified by self-dealing (short
of outright theft). They will have no salaries or perquisites that they
can take to excess, nor will they have stockholders' financial conflicts
with other constituents or stockholders that can be turned to their ad-
vantage through opportunistic behavior. Of course the economist will
then argue the flip side: if there is no self-interest, there is no motiva-
tion for directors to do their jobs.19 8 This is where I part entirely with
the neoclassicists and suggest that directors might do their jobs simply
because they have the responsibility to do so. Moreover, their jobs as
reconceived are sufficiently modest that the opportunity costs are not
great. Finally, as Lorsch demonstrates, directors are now doing their
jobs, such as they are, not out of self-interest but out of a sense of re-
sponsibility and, perhaps, altruism. 9 All my proposal does is liberate
them to concentrate on their jobs rather than their incumbency and
freedom from litigation.
More importantly, the need for legitimating directors' powers
through democratic institutions is not intuitively obvious. Rather, the
insistence upon legitimation through corporate democracy or, more par-
ticularly, stockholder suffrage, stems from the identification of the cor-
poration as the stockholders' private property.200 This is an outmoded
concept 20 1 that, importantly, denies the state its substantial interest in
long-term corporate success which, as I have demonstrated, is ill-served
by stockholder governance. Although the concept of democratic
processes as legitimating corporate power is commonly accepted and, I
198. This is the fundamental premise on which agency cost theorists base their beliefs that
management will perform their functions. The classic article is Fama, 88 J. Pol. Econ. at 292-95
(cited in note 4). But see Sen, Ethics at 15 (cited in note 11) (challenging the narrow view of
rationality as self-interest.)
199. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 30 (cited in note 2).
200. See Cal. Corp. Code § 184 (West 1990) (defining stock as "units into which the propriety
interests in a corporation are divided"); Brent Orrin Hatch, Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Busi-
ness Doctrine, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1718, 1726-27 n.62 (1983) (stating that stock is generally defined
as an interest in corporate property that belongs to the stockholders, not to the corporation) (cit-
ing Prentice-Hall, 1 Corporations 2103 (1980)). Easterbrook and Fischel have argued, as usual
from an agency cost perspective, that stockholder suffrage is justified because stockholders, as
residual claimants, have the greatest monitoring incentive. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R.
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. Law. & Econ. 395, 403 (1983). I have dealt with this
assertion with respect to debtholders at length in Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (cited in note 4). For
present purposes it should be sufficient to note that (i) the state has a significant interest in the
long-term success of its corporations that is impeded by the stockholder suffrage model, and (ii) if
other constituents lack monitoring incentives, they will simply not use the mechanisms with which
I suggest they be provided.
201. Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 193 (cited in note 2) (stating that "[tihe
stockholders' intrinsic ownership interest is a financial interest. . . rather than the 'use and enjoy-
ment' interest of the owner of a piece of personal property").
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suspect, has strong emotional pull, such processes may serve neither the
efficiency nor the responsibility of the corporation. Conversely, if such
processes were desired, a truly democratic model would extend corpo-
rate suffrage to a broader variety of constituent groups than stockhold-
ers, with the probable result of interest group affiliation of directors
resulting in greater internal corporate conflict rather than more unified
and cohesive management. Therefore, the best result appears to be the
complete removal of democratic decision-making from within the corpo-
ration. Moreover, to the extent that democratic processes are necessary
to legitimate any substantial public or quasi-public power, those
processes are implicit in the legislation that creates and empowers the
corporation. At least since the Dartmouth College case,20 2 the legisla-
ture has been a participant in corporate governance, and has not hesi-
tated to modify governance processes when doing so was in the public
interest.
203
The newly conceived board, free of self-interest, can leave manage-
ment free to use its talents to operate the business and to concentrate
its time and energies on capital structure and distribution." 4 But on
202. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 666 (1819) (Story concurring) (suggesting
the reserve power of the state). Henn and Alexander, Laws of Corporations at 14 (cited in note 2)
(noting the universality of reserve clauses in state constitutions or corporations statutes).
203. Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 1018-19 (cited in note 11).
204. A recent study by Lilli Gordon and John Pound for the Corporate Voting Research
Project provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between various takeover defense struc-
tures and corporate performance. Lilli Gordon and John Pound, Governance Matters: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance (1991).
Their study, which concludes that corporations without restrictive governance structures out-
perform those that have adopted such devices, purports to be methodologically superior to other
such studies because of their inclusion of fundamental performance measures in their analysis. Id.
at 20. The fundamental performance measures studied include return on assets and operating mar-
gin. Id. at 11. Gordon and Pound also use market-based measures such as earnings-to-price ratio,
cash flow-to-price ratio, and one- and five-year stock returns. Id. In the market-based measures,
they reflect the more commonly used methodology, including that of Pound in a prior study. John
Pound, The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence, 30
J. Law & Econ. 353 (1987). Because my proposal rejects the legitimacy of stock price or return as a
surrogate for performance, I will not analyze studies relying on this measure.
Gordon and Pound are appropriately unwilling to claim for their data the establishment of a
clear causal relationship between restrictive governance structures and performance. Rather, they
suggest that their data could lead either to the conclusion that such governance structures were
adopted by poor performing firms to prevent takeovers, or that performance deteriorated once
such governance structures were in place. Gordon and Pound, Governance Matters at 9, 20. Obvi-
ously, if the latter conclusion were to hold, the wisdom of adopting my proposal for a self-perpetu-
ating board would be questionable.
In fact their data, regardless of their conclusions, are irrelevant to my proposal, because
Gordon and Pound ask the wrong question. While the specific defensive devices adopted by indi-
vidual corporations are interesting, Gordon and Pound disregard the fact that the vast majority of
states, including Delaware, Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and California, had
state antitakeover legislation in effect throughout their testing period of 1985-89. Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 113-17 (1987) ("In 1982 ...
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what principles is it to undertake those tasks? This question assumes
even greater importance as the democratic checks on the board are
eliminated.
The appropriate principles break down into two components: first,
an aspirational governing principle, which sets the standard by which
the board is to operate on a daily basis and expresses our society's ide-
als of good corporate management; and second, a remedial duty, which
comes into play when the board dramatically fails to fulfill its aspira-
tional goals. Because of their distinct functions, and to prevent the
threat of litigation from paralyzing the board, the remedial duty neces-
sarily is more limited than the governing principle.
The governing principle already exists in corporate law with re-
spect to stockholders and has a well-developed history and meaning.
That principle is fairness: fairness in the initial allocation of rights to
corporate interests upon their creation and fairness in the distribution
of corporate assets. 0 5 I have elsewhere developed this principle of fair-
ness in the guise of a duty not to harm206 but, with the introduction of
thirty-seven states had takeover statutes. . . . Within four years of the [United States Supreme
Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), striking down Illinois' takeover
statute,] new takeover laws have been adopted in twenty-one states"). See, for example, 8 Del.
Code Ann. § 203 (1988); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32 § 11.75 (1989); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. l0F, § 3
(1992); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 110D, § 3 (1987); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1600 (McKinney, 1986); N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney, 1988); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2551 (Purdon, 1991); 15 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2561 (1991). While corporations undoubtedly adopted their own defensive devices for some
reason, even in light of these statutes it seems unreasonable to draw any conclusion from Gordon
and Pound's data without some control testing of the relative performance of corporations incorpo-
rated in states without takeover laws and in those states that have such laws. Studies have been
done on the effect of antitakeover legislation on stock prices. See, for example, Donald Margotta,
Stock Price Effects of Pennsylvania Act (Dec. 1990, revised Feb. 1991). For the reasons I stated
earlier in this Article, these studies, in focusing on stock prices, use a measure of performance that
is not relevant to my analysis.
The second reason that Gordon's and Pound's study is irrelevant to my proposal is based on
the measures of fundamental performance they chose to analyze. Both return on assets and operat-
ing margin measure the corporation's performance after deducting distributions to all constituen-
cies but stockholders, including debtholders, suppliers, customers, and employees. Return on assets
measures the "ratio of net income to total assets," Eugene F. Brigham and Louis C. Gapenski,
Financial Management: Theory and Practice at 882 (Dryden, 6th ed. 1991), with net income obvi-
ously excluding all expenses, Robert W. Hamilton, Fundamentals of Modern Business § 8.3
(1989). Operating margin relates pretax income to gross sales. Id. at § 9.10.1. Consequently, it too
fails to account for distributions to other constituencies. Although these are both standard mea-
sures of financial performance, they are measures developed in a world of stockholder-centric anal-
ysis. They measure only the performance in terms of residual claims, and not in terms of the
broader corporation. Thus, they cannot be used to dispute the desirability of adopting my
proposal.
205. I have already described the fairness test existing.in corporate law, see note 147. The
fairness test I envision here originates in that test but, as I discuss below, is meant to be a higher
level aspirational standard of conduct.
206. Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1222-28 (cited in note 4); Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at
579 (cited in note 2).
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board duties to constituents at the capital structuring stage, this fair-
ness principle must go even further. It means that boards are not to
negotiate debt contracts, employment contracts, or other agreements
with the goal of narrowly defining the rights of the parties thereto.
Rather it means that boards must broadly exhibit good faith in negotia-
tions, appreciating and acting upon the position that a reasonable third
party would take in entering into a loan agreement, collective bargain-
ing agreement, or supply contract. It means that boards must acknowl-
edge the mutual interdependence of corporate constituencies and
recognize the importance of each to the corporation's long-run survival.
At the distributional end, it means fairness in construing the con-
tracts that have been negotiated. The law reports are full of cases in
which corporations have insisted upon the strict construction of con-
tract language with respect to matters that neither party could reasona-
bly foresee, to recapture for the stockholders' benefit costs that, seen
contextually, the stockholders (acting through the board) probably
would, or at least should, have assumed. °7 It means recognizing the rel-
ative indeterminacy of many of the types of contracts that corporations
enter into with constituents, and interpreting those contracts in light of
the reality that neither party had any real intention with respect to the
matter at issue at the time the contract was made, and therefore inter-
preting it in a manner that is fair and reasonable at the time the issue
arises. This leads to using the contract as a baseline minimum, with the
board avoiding harm to constituent groups by refraining from imposing
upon them a disproportionate amount of the costs of enhancing corpo-
rate profit. In other words, and this should apply at the structuring
stage as well, the costs to be borne by each constituent group should be
proportional to the corporate wealth to which they are entitled or, to
put it still differently, reflective of the extent to which such group pro-
vides benefits to, and justifiably relies upon, the corporation.
Perhaps the best way of explicating this duty is by example. Once
the broad principle is acknowledged, the parameters of the duty can be
set by common-law development. Case law is replete with examples of
directors damaging other corporate constituent groups to enhance the
interests of stockholders. For example, in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. 20 8
the board failed to give proper notice of a call that would have led to
bondholders' widespread conversion of their bonds into stock to enable
them to capture a greater conversion value. In Pittsburgh Terminal
Corp. v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,20 9 inadequate notice of a spin-off
207. Some of the cases are identified in notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
208. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975).
209. 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982).
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was given to debtholders to prevent their debt conversion to take ad-
vantage of newly-created value. Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc.21 0
presents a similar problem. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR
Nabisco21I and Eliasen v. Green Bay & Western Railroad Co.21 2 present
situations in which the expropriation of bondholders' wealth to equity
holders was justified on the basis of limited contract terms and stock-
holder profit-maximization. Dalton v. American Investment Co.2"3 and
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.21 4 provide similar examples of re-
strictive contractual interpretation-and a narrow vision of directors'
duties-to the detriment of preferred stockholders. Glass Makers, Pot-
tery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v.
Wickes Companies, Inc.215 provides an example of employee dislocation
caused for stockholders' benefit, and similar examples have been re-
ported elsewhere.216
In each of these cases and others, the principle of corporate exis-
tence for the benefit of stockholders has led to board decisions that
have serious negative effects on other constituencies. In almost all of
these cases, courts have upheld boards' narrow contractual interpreta-
tions to permit opportunistic behavior to occur. Under the fairness
principle, such conduct would be open to rigorous scrutiny to determine
its propriety in light of all of the circumstances of the transactions and
relationships.
For most boards, most of the time, articulating such a governing
principle should be enough to ensure that it is followed. In other words,
we can assume that the board will act in good faith. The strongest force
of the principle of fairness may be in its aspirational qualities and its
usefulness as a guiding principle for the board.1 7 But inevitably the
board will depart occasionally from its duties, and for such occasions a
remedial enforcement mechanism must be crafted.1
210. 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969).
211. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
212. 569 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
213. 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985).
214. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
215. 243 N.J. Super. 44, 578 A.2d 402 (1990).
216. For example, see O'Connor, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1238, 1241-42, 1255 (cited in note 102);
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 614, 725 (1988).
217. See Eisenberg, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 582 (cited in note 50) (stating that "most peo-
ple will voluntarily conform their conduct to the aspirational standards expressed by the society
through its laws and indeed through its morality"); id. at 594 (noting that the "aspirational role of
law may be much more effective in reducing agency costs than either the sanctioning role or other
external check$, like markets").
218. The duties I discuss here, and for which I describe an enforcement mechanism, relate
only to the allocation of corporate assets among competing groups. Elsewhere I have labelled these
as "horizontal" duties. Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1213 (cited in note 4); Mitchell, 70 Texas L.
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The enforcement mechanism I envision takes account of the fact
that no one group is entitled to be treated as the center of the corpora-
tion, or entitled to any particular proportion of the corporation's assets.
However, since enforcement of this duty now becomes the central
mechanism of board discipline, some incentive must exist for a constit-
uent to bring litigation. On the other hand, a culturally ingrained fear
of strike suits and excessive litigation21 suggests that some clear pa-
rameters need to be developed to prevent litigation from occurring too
readily and to establish decisional principles for courts.
I suggest a remedial cause of action structured around the least
common denominator of the new board's duties: the duty not to harm.
Each constituent identified by legislation as entitled to the board's con-
sideration would be permitted to bring an action against the board as-
serting that the board had breached its duty not to harm; that is, in
making a corporate distribution or distributions, or by failing to do so,
it allocated excessive corporate costs or insufficient corporate wealth to
the complaining constituent. The court would be required to evaluate
the terms of the constituent's initial contract with the corporation, to
study the course of the constituent's relationship with the corporation
to determine the overall fairness of its treatment by the board, and
then to determine whether the board had harmed the constituent in
light of the contract and relationship.
The way in which the duty not to harm would apply is based on a
test drawn from close corporation law.220 A constituent group could es-
tablish a prima facie case of breach of the duty not to harm by specifi-
cally alleging that a disproportionate amount of the costs or other
burdens of a corporate decision were imposed upon it in light of the
factors described above. In response, the directors could demonstrate
that both the transaction and the cost allocation were designed to
achieve a legitimate business purpose, and that the costs were allocated
among a number of constituent groups. The plaintiff could then estab-
lish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the allocation of burdens
Rev. at 579 (cited in note 2). This does not address the traditional duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation, which the board would still possess and which would continue to be enforced through
derivative litigation. I have described how derivative standing to enforce those duties should and
could be extended to bondholders. Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1195 (cited in note 4). I suggest
that the same principles could be applied to other corporate constituents, although complete anal-
ysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
219. See, for example, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-42 (1975).
See also Stanley M. Beck, The Shareholders' Derivative Action, 52 Can. Bar Rev. 159, 162-63
(1974) (describing American hostility to stockholder litigation).
220. Mitchell, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1223-24 (cited in note 4); Mitchell, 70 Texas L. Rev. at
579 (cited in note 2). Specifically, the test is based on those developed in Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1977), and Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d
487, 335 N.E.2d 334 (1975).
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to it was unfairly disproportionate to its benefits or contrary to its legit-
imate expectations based upon its initial contract and the course of its
relationship with the corporation.
An illustration of how the self-perpetuating board, the aspirational
principle of fairness, and the remedial duty not to harm might work
together is provided by applying the scheme to a case involving the hy-
pothetical Greenacres Corporation.22' Assume that Greenacres Corpora-
tion is a publicly-held company with 30,000,000 shares of common stock
outstanding, trading in the market at $25. Assume further that
Clampitt Co. announces a hostile tender offer for Greenacres at $35.
The Greenacres board, after determining the Clampitt offer to be
grossly inadequate, announces an exchange offer for up to 10,000,000
shares pursuant to which it offers to exchange for each share of stock a
note with a principal amount of $40 at an interest rate two percentage
points above prime. The notes have protective covenants limiting
Greenacres' ability to incur additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends
without the approval of a majority of Greenacres' independent
directors.
The exchange offer is fully subscribed. Clampitt increases its offer
to $40. In response, Greenacres' board negotiates an agreement with
Drysdale, Inc. for a leveraged buyout pursuant to which Drysdale will
sell off significant assets of Greenacres. Greenacres agrees to waive the
note covenants to permit Drysdale's acquisition to occur. Immediately,
the trading price of the notes, which had traded at par, drops to $33,
and noteholders begin to threaten the board with litigation. After inten-
sive negotiations and a bidding war, Drysdale ultimately acquires
Greenacres for $1 per share more than Clampitt's final price, and the
notes stabilize at $34 in the market.
The additional consideration paid to Greenacres' stockholders is
$20,000,000. The value lost by the noteholders is $60,000,000. Ulti-
mately, the cost of obtaining the best price for the stockholders is a loss
for the noteholders three times as great as the price increase. The net
cost to the corporation of ensuring that the board refrain from self-
dealing is $40,000,000.
Assume further that Drysdale, after acquiring Greenacres, finds it
necessary to close certain of Greenacres' factories and lay off workers in
order to service the debt it incurred in the transaction. Also assume
that Greenacres was the largest employer in each of the communities
where the plant had operated. Without attempting to quantify these
losses, it should be clear that employees would suffer by losing their
221. The following example is based upon the facts presented in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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jobs (perhaps without the prospect of new jobs in their communities),
and that the communities themselves would suffer as a result of the
plant closings and layoffs.
The decision of the board to accept the higher-priced Drysdale of-
fer is mandated under existing law by the principle of stockholder-cen-
trismY2 The result might have been different if my proposed model
were adopted. In the first place, the self-perpetuating board structure
makes such a scenario unlikely to occur. My proposal would require
purchasers who choose to acquire the corporation by means of a stock
purchase to purchase all of the outstanding public debt in order to ob-
tain control of the board. This requirement would probably eliminate
buyers' use of leverage to pay stockholders enormous premiums at the
expense of debtholders, employees, and other constituents. Instead,
boards would be in a position (given antitakeover legislation and defen-
sive measures) to negotiate a price for the entire company and then to
allocate the consideration (as well as the burdens) among the constitu-
ents.223 Under the principle of fairness, my proposal would require the
board to consider the circumstances and expectations of each constitu-
ent group. In allocating financial consideration between stockholders
and noteholders, for example, the board would have to consider the cir-
cumstances of the debt's creation, contract terms, returns already paid
to each constituent, the reasonable expectations of noteholders and
stockholders, and the trading price of the stock prior to the announce-
ment of the transaction.
At the same time, the principle of fairness would require the board
to provide for the interests of employees in order to diminish the poten-
tially dislocating costs of the takeover. An example of this might be a
promise from the purchaser not to lay off employees, at least for some
period of time, and to provide transitional assistance (including sever-
ance pay and retraining) if such layoffs were to become necessary. The
board would be empowered (and indeed would have the duty) to obtain
such concessions to the extent that their cost (in terms of diminished
consideration to stockholders and bondholders) was fair. The board
could make similar transitional protective arrangements on the same
basis with respect to other corporate constituents, although, as the con-
stituent groups become less central to (and presumably less reliant
upon) the corporation, the extent to which provision has to be made for
them would diminish.
222. This is the rule of Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
223. Examples of this process are provided by the facts in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels,




If for some unlikely reason an acquiror were to purchase only the
equity of the corporation and retain the existing board, the duty not to
harm would require the board to weigh the interests of all constituent
groups in permitting the acquisition to occur. If, in the Greenacres hy-
pothetical, the board permitted the higher priced, highly leveraged offer
to succeed at the expense of the noteholders, the noteholders could
bring an action against the board based on the duty not to harm. The
significant loss in note value would establish a prima facie case, thus
leaving the board to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate corporate
purpose. Ultimately, the noteholders could prove that the same purpose
could have been accomplished with less harm to the noteholders and a
fairer allocation of the benefits and burdens of the takeover.
Whether the noteholders could sustain this burden would depend
on an evaluation of all the circumstances including, in this hypothetical
case, the fact that the noteholders received their notes as part of an
exchange offer to help the corporation remain independent and thus,
assuming no trading of the notes, were themselves current or former
stockholders of the corporation. The board might have issued the notes
at an above-market interest rate to compensate for the risk of a highly
leveraged offer. Conversely, had the board permitted the lower-priced
offer to succeed, it arguably could defend against a stockholders' suit on
the basis of having legitimately prevented harm to the noteholders at
only slight expense to the stockholders.
Greenacres' employees would have a similar cause of action, ana-
lyzed in a similar manner. In considering the employees' rights, relevant
evidence would include express or implicit promises of job security,
length of time that facilities had been opened, the average length of
service of employees of such facilities, compensation levels relative to
those of comparable jobs (to help evaluate, if possible, the trade-off be-
tween compensation and job security), severance benefits, and other
forms of vested contingent compensation generally available to
employees.
Any constituent group could also argue that a kind of protective
synergy exists, that protecting one group would also result in protection
to others, in a variation of the private attorney general model once com-
mon in challenges to the actions of administrative agencies. For exam-
ple, the noteholder plaintiffs could argue that, in addition to the
protection afforded them by the decreased leverage resulting from the
lower-priced offer, employees and the communities in which they
worked would similarly be protected by reducing the need for plant
closings and layoffs to pay debt service. This would demonstrate that
the net reduction in overall losses from accepting the lower priced offer




Fashioning a remedy for breach of the duty not to harm is difficult.
The easiest case is when litigation occurs prior to the closing of a given
transaction or the implementation of a particular decision, because it
permits a court to enjoin such action and order a reconsideration by the
board of its effects on the constituent group that establishes breach.224
Far more difficult is the context in which litigation is brought after ac-
tion has been taken. While requiring rescission of a particular course of
action might provide relief, such a remedy is not always possible nor
desirable because of additional harm that it might cause. Alternatively,
demanding that directors pay damages for actions that do not benefit
them seems fundamentally unfair, as well as bad public policy. Perhaps
the best remedy would be for the court to order the board to take com-
pensating action to reallocate a portion of the corporate wealth to the
injured constituent group within a given period of time.225
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance is at a crossroads. The short-term interests
of institutional stockholders and the increasingly profound effect that
the large public corporation has on society, all of which were amply il-
lustrated by the 1980s takeover boom, have led to a reconsideration of
the structure and substance of the governance of American corpora-
tions. I have suggested that a great deal of the problem lies with the
bilateral legal structure of intracorporate relationships and the neo-
classical assumptions on which corporate governance is built. I have
suggested that the conditions which originally led to this structural re-
sponse have been exaggerated or modified, and that the existing struc-
ture should be changed based upon a reconceptualization of the
appropriate role of the board of directors. I have also argued that the
current structure of corporate governance unrealistically excludes a
number of constituent groups who are vital to the corporation's survival
and who, in turn, depend upon the corporation for their well-being, and
that the consequence of this exclusion is the repression of the board's
exercise of its best long-term business judgment. Ultimately, I have sug-
gested that these assumptions and narrowness of focus have led to the
224. It is beyond my purpose here to evaluate the legal changes, if any, that would be re-
quired to assure constituents of a reliable flow of relevant corporate information. Nader, Green,
and Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation at 132-79 (cited in note 26), offer an interesting
treatment of the problem.
225. Such a remedy could be similar to that of "compensatory side payments" proposed by
Albert Barkey with respect to bondholders' rights. Albert Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a
Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20
Creighton L. Rev. 47, 74-78 (1986).
1992] 1317
1318 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1263
short-term management characteristic of American corporations. The
new model of corporate governance and of the board of directors I sug-
gest has the potential to empower the board to enhance corporate wel-
fare by creating a more realistic, and therefore more successful,
corporate law.
